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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici are Professor Brian JM Quinn and law 
students, Niloufar Abae and Alex Pena, working in the 
Amicus Brief Clinic at Boston College Law School. 
Amici submit this brief pro se, representing no 
institution, group or association, in response to the 
Court’s general solicitation for amicus briefs in this 
case. Amici have academic and professional interest in 
the subject of corporate law. Amici have no economic 
interest in the case and have no relationship with any 
of the parties before the Court.   
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
 
The Court has solicited amicus briefs on the 
following question:  
On a petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 
(2), under what circumstances a judge may order the 
dissolution of a corporation on the ground that a 
deadlock exists and that irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered; what 
constitutes a deadlock within the meaning of G. L. c. 
156D, § 14.30 (2). 
 
The Amici write to call the Court’s attention to 
a very recent decision of Delaware’s highest court 
addressing similar issues under a Delaware judicial 
dissolution statute that is comparable in many 
respects to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2). On February 
13, 2017, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware 
handed down an en banc decision in Shawe vs. Elting, 
No. 423, 2016, C.A. Nos. 9686, 9700, and 10449 (Del. 
Feb. 13, 2017). (hereafter Shawe II),
1
 affirming the 
Delaware Court of Chancery decision reported at In re 
Shawe, C.A. Nos. 9661-CB, 9686-CB, 9700-CB, and 10449-
CB, (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (hereafter Shawe I).
2
 The 
                                                 
1
 Shawe II can be found at:  
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=2
52550. 
2
 Shawe I can also be found at: 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=2
28080. 
 
 
2 
 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court’s 
decision to appoint a custodian to sell a profitable 
corporation was supported by the facts found after a 
trial, was permitted by statute, and was not an abuse 
of discretion. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 
9686, slip op. at 13; see also Giuricich v. Emtrol 
Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982) (using the abuse 
of discretion standard in a case regarding judicial 
dissolution). 
Because Delaware has a very robust corporate 
common law and because Delaware’s judicial dissolution 
statute is comparable in many respects to G. L. c. 
156D, § 14.30 (2), Amici suggest that it would be 
appropriate for this Court to look to the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shawe II and related 
cases for guidance in resolving the questions for 
which the court has solicited amicus submissions. See 
No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686.  
 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This brief brings to the attention of the Court 
recent case law from a sister state that is relevant 
to the Court’s solicitation for briefs in the present 
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case. The decisions in Shawe I and Shawe II received a 
high degree of adverse public attention for their 
application of Delaware’s judicial dissolution 
statute. (pp. 6-10) On appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that, in ordering the sale of a profitable 
corporation, the Chancellor did not abuse his 
discretion in the application of Delaware’s judicial 
dissolution statute. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, slip 
op. at 13. The relevant judicial intervention statute, 
comparable to Massachusetts’ § 14.30, requires a 
showing of a director deadlock that cannot be resolved 
by shareholders, and a threat of irreparable injury or 
actual irreparable injury to the corporation. G.L. c. 
156D, § 14.30 (2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) 
(2017). (pp.10-15) 
In Shawe II, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
the Chancery Court’s opinion where the Chancellor 
found there to be a deadlock between the two directors 
that could not be resolved by the shareholders. In 
determining there is a director deadlock, a Delaware 
court looks to whether the board is so genuinely 
“divided respecting the management of the affairs of 
the corporation” that the board is unable to agree on 
matters of corporate importance like issuance of 
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distributions, pursuit of acquisitions, hiring and 
retention of personnel, among other things. See Hoban 
vs. Dardanella Electric Corp., No. 7615, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Jun. 12, 1984). Additionally, Delaware courts also 
recognize director deadlock when the level of distrust 
between the directors “strikes at the heart of the 
palpable dysfunction that exists in the governance of 
the Company.” See Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. 
at 70. That is, even where a board can make decisions, 
where the degree of distrust and dysfunction between 
board members is high, a court can declare a director 
deadlock. (pp. 15-23). 
In Shawe II, the Delaware Supreme Court also 
upheld the Chancellor’s finding that the corporation 
at issue was suffering or being threatened by 
irreparable injury emanating from the director 
deadlock. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, 
slip op. at 2. The Chancellor found notwithstanding 
the fact that the corporation was profitable, 
“management of the Company is one of complete and 
utter dysfunction that is causing the business to 
suffer and threatens it with irreparable harm 
notwithstanding its profitability to date.” See Shawe 
I at 31. It is worth emphasizing the mere fact that a 
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corporation is presently profitable is not evidence of 
a lack of threatened or actual irreparable injury to 
the corporation. (pp. 23-25).  
In circumstances where there is director deadlock 
and threatened or actual irreparable injury to the 
corporation and where measures short of a dissolution 
or court mandated sale have been tried but have 
failed, a court is within its discretion to order the 
dissolution or sale of the corporation. See Shawe II 
at 2. (pp. 25-28).  
In addition to Delaware’s comparable dissolution 
statute, Delaware also has a separate judicial 
dissolution statute for closely-held corporations 
where there are two fifty-percent shareholders. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273. This statute requires only 
a showing of a genuine deadlock without the 
requirement that shareholders in a two-shareholder 
corporation show irreparable injury. See id. Delaware 
jurisprudence treats the dissolution petitions of 
corporations with two fifty-percent shareholders like 
no-fault divorces, recognizing that once there is a 
genuine deadlock, there is little to be gained by 
courts mandating a continued dysfunctional 
relationship. (pp. 28-32). 
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 We urge that the Court clarify the law in 
Massachusetts with respect to the standards for 
judicial dissolution and, in light of this new legal 
guidance, consider remanding the present case to the 
trial judge for further consideration as to true 
deadlock and the existence or threat of irreparable 
injury. (pp. 32-36). 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
 
 The Court has solicited briefs asking for 
discussion of what circumstances may permit a judge to 
order the dissolution of a corporation on the grounds 
that a deadlock exists and that the business is 
suffering from or being threatened with irreparable 
injury pursuant to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2). While 
this issue may appear to be a relatively 
straightforward question of application of 
Massachusetts corporate law, recent events outside of 
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the Commonwealth have raised the issue of judicial 
dissolution to one of national prominence.
3
   
 In Shawe I, after a lengthy trial, the Chancellor 
ordered the sale of a profitable corporation over the 
objections of one of the stockholders. See C.A. No. 
9661-CB, slip op. at 83-84. The trial court’s decision 
generated an unusual amount of negative national media 
attention.
4
 For example, high-profile political figures 
like former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani weighed in on 
the trial court’s ruling characterizing it as 
“capricious” and arguing in the press that the court’s 
action was “a very intrusive ruling in terms of the 
free market.”5 Separately, Mayor Giuliani stated, “I 
don’t like courts, I consider courts part of the 
government, and I don’t like the government ordering 
                                                 
3
 Katia Savchuk, Inside The Nasty Corporate Divorce 
Between Ex-Lovers Who Built A Company Worth Nearly $1 
Billion, FORBES (May 25, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2016/05/25/li
z-elting-transperfect-engaged-cofounders-phil-shawe-
corporate-divorce/#3a3141782c2e. 
4
 Steven Davidoff Solomon, TransPerfect is Threatened 
by Owners’ Petulance, N.Y. TIMES (NOV. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/business/dealbook/t
ransperfect-is-threatened-by-owners-petulance.html. 
5
 Jeff Mordock, Giuliani blasts Delaware court for 
decision in lover’s spat, DELAWARE ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2016, 
5:13 PM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2016/04/22/g
iuliani-blasts-delaware-court-decision-lovers-
spat/83345454/  
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companies to do things like dissolve themselves, 
especially when it’s a successful [business] 
organization.”6 On appeal, the case also attracted the 
attention of Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz who 
represented one of the shareholders. Prof. Dershowitz 
made arguments that the Chancellor’s order violated 
the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
7
 
Additionally, the case also attracted the attention of 
a well-organized employee opposition group, Citizens 
for a Pro-Business Delaware, that objected to the 
court’s remedy of a sale of the corporation. Mordock, 
supra note 5. The employee group also took the 
unprecedented step of running television 
advertisements against the court’s ruling.8 The overall 
level of attention this particular case attracted was 
                                                 
6
 Sam Waltz, Giuliani steps into ‘business divorce’ 
case in Chancery, DELAWARE BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/giuliani-steps-
business-divorce-case-chancery/ 
7
 Jeff Mordock, Alan Dershowitz, Justice Strine spar 
over TransPerfect, DELAWARE ONLINE (Jan. 19, 2017, 9:49 
AM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2017/01/18/sp
arks-fly-heated-transperfect-case/96719902/  
8
 Jeff Mordock, TransPerfect workers turn to TV ads in 
bid to stop sale, DELAWARE ONLINE (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:02 
PM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2017/01/03/t
ransperfect-workers-turn-tv-ads-bid-stop-
sale/96118432/ 
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wildly out of line with similar previous judicial 
dissolution cases.  
Putting the volume and vehemence of the 
opposition to the Chancery Court’s opinion to one 
side, the Delaware Supreme Court held that in ordering 
a sale of the profitable corporation, the Chancellor 
did not abuse his discretion in the application of 
Delaware’s judicial dissolution statute. See Shawe II, 
No. 423, 2016, slip op. at 13. In reaching the 
conclusion to order a sale, the Chancellor considered 
and rejected other measures short of a sale to break a 
deadlock between the shareholders (two fifty-percent 
shareholders who made up the entirety of directors of 
the corporation), including the appointment of a 
custodian to serve as a tiebreaking board vote; 
extension of failed mediation efforts; and 
consideration of repeated efforts outside the 
courthouse “to resolve the dispute in New York, 
including settlement discussions, a mediation, and 
multiple sessions with a court-appointed Special 
Master.” See id. at 25-26. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the corporation was otherwise profitable, the 
Chancellor found the corporation was suffering or was 
threatened to suffer “irreparable injury” due to the 
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dysfunctional relationship between the shareholders 
and ordered a court appointed custodian to oversee a 
sale of the corporation to one of the two principal 
shareholders or to a third party. See Shawe I, C.A. 
No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 80-84. 
 Amici seek to provide the Court with additional 
briefing on the common law application of Delaware’s 
equivalent to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2). Given the 
similarities between Delaware and the Commonwealth’s 
judicial intervention statutes, this Court may find 
the recent Delaware Supreme Court ruling persuasive 
authority when considering the application of G. L. c. 
156D, § 14.30 (2) with respect to the questions of 
“deadlock” and “irreparable injury”. 
I. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW BASIS TO LOOK TO OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS WHEN INTERPRETING A COMPARABLE 
PROVISION WITHIN THE MASSACHUSETTS BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT 
 
The language of the Model Business Corporation 
Act’s (MBCA) provision on judicial dissolution9 can be 
found in many state statutes,
10
 including both the 
                                                 
9
 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2016) 
10
 The following court decisions dealt with the same, 
or comparable, judicial dissolution statute outlined 
in the MBCA: Donovan v. Quade, 830 F.Supp. 2d 460 
(N.D. Ill. 2011); Bendetson v. Killarney, Inc., 913 
A.2d 756 (N.H. 2006); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 
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Massachusetts Business Corporation Act and parts of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law. G.L. c. 156D, § 
14.30 (2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (2017). Under 
our own statute the Superior Court “may dissolve a 
corporation”:  
(2) upon a petition filed by the 
shareholders holding not less than 40 per 
cent of the total combined voting power of 
all the shares of the corporation's stock 
outstanding and entitled to vote on the 
question of dissolution, if it is 
established that: 
(i) the directors are deadlocked in the 
management of the corporate affairs, the 
shareholders are unable to break the 
deadlock, and irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered; 
or 
(ii) the shareholders are deadlocked in 
voting power and have failed, for a period 
that includes at least 2 consecutive annual 
meeting dates, to elect successors to 
directors whose terms have expired, or would 
have expired upon the election of their 
successors, and irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being 
suffered[.] 
 
See G.L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2). Similarly, the Delaware 
dissolution statute provides in relevant part:  
(a) The Court of Chancery, upon application 
of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more 
persons to be custodians, and, if the 
corporation is insolvent, to be receivers, 
of and for any corporation when: 
(1) At any meeting held for the election of 
directors the stockholders are so divided 
                                                                                                                                     
P.3d 1 (Wash. 2003); Mordka v. Mordka Enterprises, 
Inc., 693 P.2d 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
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that they have failed to elect successors to 
directors whose terms have expired or would 
have expired upon qualification of their 
successors; or 
(2) The business of the corporation is 
suffering or is threatened with irreparable 
injury because the directors are so divided 
respecting the management of the affairs of 
the corporation that the required vote for 
action by the board of directors cannot be 
obtained and the stockholders are unable to 
terminate this division[.] 
 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1)-(2). 
To the extent that one of the goals of the 
drafters of the Massachusetts Business Corporation Act 
was to encourage regard for external interpretation of 
the MBCA, there is a statutory and common law basis 
for Massachusetts courts to look to other 
jurisdictions when interpreting a statutory provision 
that lacks robust application.  See G.L. c. 156D, § 
1.50 cmt. 1 (where the drafters of the Massachusetts 
Business Corporations Act commented that “as the 
courts of other jurisdictions interpret the 
[MBCA]…those interpretations should be given 
significant weight in the interpretation of the 
Massachusetts courts of identical or comparable 
provisions of the Act”); Spenlinhauer v. Spencer 
Press, Inc., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 68 (2011).   
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Since the Delaware and Massachusetts judicial 
intervention statutes are comparable, and in some 
respects, nearly identical, see Infra, the Supreme 
Judicial Court may look to decisions in Delaware 
courts, should it so choose, for guidance in declaring 
Massachusetts law with respect to questions of 
“deadlock” and “irreparable injury” in the context of 
judicial dissolution. See c. 156D, § 1.50 cmt. 1; 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 
No. 129 Benefit Fund vs. Tucci, SJC-12137, slip op. at 
11 n.8 (Mass. Mar. 6, 2017) (Tucci) (highlighting the 
Court’s reliance on the comments to c. 156D and 
quoting Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 625 (2010)). 
II. MGL SECTION 14.30 (2) AND DGCL SECTION 226(a) 
SHARE COMPARABLE, AND IN SOME RESPECTS, NEARLY 
IDENTICAL, LANGUAGE ON JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
 
Section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (DGCL) and Chapter 156D § 14.30 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws (MGL) are comparable 
statutes that govern judicial intervention in their 
respective states. See c. 156D, § 14.30 (2); tit. 8, § 
226(a). Both grant eligibility for judicial 
dissolution when a shareholder files a petition  
demonstrating a deadlock between shareholders over the 
election of successive directors (i.e. shareholder 
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deadlock) or a deadlock between directors over the 
management of the corporation’s affairs, which is 
unable to be broken by its shareholders, and is 
threatening or causing irreparable injury to the 
corporation (i.e. director deadlock). See c. 156D, § 
14.30 (2); tit. 8, § 226 (a)(1)-(2). The 
aforementioned provisions of these two statutes 
reflect comparable, and in some respects, nearly 
identical language, regarding the statutory 
prerequisites for judicial intervention.   
Before analyzing Delaware’s jurisprudence on its 
comparable provisions, it is important to note for the 
Court the extent to which DGCL § 226(a)(1) is somewhat 
more liberal than MGL § 14.30 (2) (ii). First, 
Delaware’s statute requires only one meeting to 
establish that the shareholders are deadlocked in the 
election of directors, rather than two consecutive 
meetings under the Massachusetts statute. See c. 156D, 
§ 14.30 (2) (ii); tit. 8, § 226 (a)(1). Second, in the 
case of shareholder deadlock, Delaware’s statute does 
not require a showing that irreparable injury to the 
corporation be threatened or suffered before a court 
will entertain a petition for judicial intervention. 
See tit. 8, § 226 (a)(1); Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238–
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39 (holding that the intent behind Section 226 was to 
create a more liberal and available remedy from the 
injustices, such as a self-perpetuating board, arising 
from corporate deadlock situations).  
While DGCL § 226(a) is not entirely identical to 
MGL § 14.30 (2), its closeness in language with 
respect to shareholder deadlock, coupled with its 
nearly identical language with respect to director 
deadlock, reflect a statute that is sufficiently 
comparable to warrant the Supreme Judicial Court 
looking to Delaware decisions for guidance. See G.L. 
c. 156D, § 1.50. 
III. THE SHAWE DECISIONS BEAR ON THE QUESTIONS 
PRESENTED BEFORE THIS COURT 
 
Shawe involved the acrimonious relationship of 
two co-CEOs and sole directors of the company, 
TransPerfect Global, Inc., who were unable to agree on 
the dissolution of their company. See C.A. No. 9661-
CB, slip op. at 1. The petitioner, and former fiancée 
of the respondent, owns 50% of the corporation while 
the respondent and his mother collectively own the 
remaining 50% (split 49% and 1% respectively).
11
 The 
                                                 
11
 The respondent effectively “treated his mother's 
share as his own property and himself as a 50% co-
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issue presented to the Delaware Supreme Court was 
whether the Chancery Court had abused its discretion 
when it appointed a custodian to sell a profitable 
corporation under DGCL § 226(a). See Shawe II, No. 
423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 13.  
During trial, the Chancellor grappled with the 
issue of a judicial mandate to sell a profitable 
corporation by assessing the level of dysfunction that 
existed between the two parties, and the 
“irretrievable deadlocks” over significant managerial 
matters that caused the business to both suffer and be 
threatened with irreparable injury. See Shawe I, C.A. 
No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 72-82.  
With respect to the claim of shareholder 
deadlock, all three shareholders (petitioner, 
respondent, and the respondent’s mother) stipulated 
that such a deadlock existed. See id. at 66-67. 
Although the court deemed this stipulation enough to 
warrant judicial intervention under DGCL Section 
226(a)(1), the court nevertheless proceeded to analyze 
the dissolution petition under the Section 226(a)(2) 
claim of director deadlock. See id. 
                                                                                                                                     
owner of the Company.” See Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, 
slip op. at 3. 
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With respect to the question of director 
deadlock, the court found that the facts of the case 
met all three preconditions necessary under Section 
226(a)(2)
12
 to warrant judicial intervention. See Shawe 
I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 77-78. In their 
analysis, the court gave considerable weight to the 
level of distrust and the ongoing feud between the two 
directors, whether the deadlocks were genuine, the 
impact of the deadlocks on the employees, whether the 
governance structure was wholly dysfunctional, and 
whether there was potential for long-term harm to the 
business. See id. at 72-82. During the course of this 
analysis, the trial court evaluated both the level of 
irreparable injury to the corporation as well as 
whether measures less-intrusive than a court-mandated 
sale might resolve the director deadlock. See id. at 
80-83. 
The trial court ordered a sale of the 
corporation, granting petitions under both DGCL §§ 
226(a)(1) (shareholder deadlock) and (a)(2) (director 
deadlock). See C.A. No. 9661-CB at 104. The structure 
of the court-ordered sale made it possible for either 
                                                 
12
 These are the same three preconditions under G.L. c. 
156D, § 14.30 (2). 
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principal shareholder or an unrelated third party to 
bid on the company. See id. at 84-85. In mandating a 
sale, the court’s opinion provides a useful roadmap 
for jurisdictions with comparable judicial 
intervention statutes to decide judicial dissolution 
cases involving profitable corporations. See id. at 
66-82. 
 Accordingly, the particular aspects of the 
discussions in Shawe I and Shawe II, bear on the 
questions presented to the Court in the present case. 
See C.A. No. 9661-CB; No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686. 
For these reasons, we provide the Court with a 
comparative analysis of DGCL § 226(a), Delaware’s 
equivalent to G. L. c. 156D, § 14.30 (2). 
IV. DGCL SECTION 226(a) IS COMPARABLE TO MGL 
SECTION 14.30 (2) 
 
A. Guidance on What Constitutes Shareholder 
Deadlock Within the Meaning of Section 14.30 
(2) (ii) of the MGL  
 
With regard to the question of shareholder 
deadlock, Delaware courts have been explicit in their 
conclusion that the “language of §226(a)(1) is clear 
and unambiguous.” See Miller vs. Miller, C.A. No. 
2140-VCN, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009). With respect 
to what actions by shareholders or level of acrimony 
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among shareholders constitutes shareholder deadlock, 
the court in Miller held that, because Section 
226(a)(1) contained “no other condition or exception, 
expressed or implied,” it was impermissible judicial 
legislation to engraft any such prerequisite outside 
of a showing that the shareholders were so genuinely 
divided that they were unable to elect successive 
directors (i.e. shareholder deadlock). See id. 
Consequently, the mere failure of shareholders to 
elect directors after their terms have expired, 
without more, is sufficient for a showing of 
shareholder deadlock under Section 226(a)(1). See id. 
Given that MGL Section 14.30 (2) is also clear and 
unambiguous in its language with respect to 
shareholder deadlock, a Massachusetts court need not 
engraft any prerequisite on a finding of shareholder 
deadlock if shareholders are unable to elect 
successors to directors after at least two consecutive 
annual meeting dates. See G.L. c. 156D, § 1.50 cmt. 1. 
B. Guidance on What Constitutes Director 
Deadlock Within the Meaning of Section 14.30 
(2)(i) of the MGL  
 
Like Massachusetts courts, under DGCL § 226(a)(2) 
Delaware courts are tasked with assessing whether (1) 
the directors are deadlocked in the management of the 
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corporation’s affairs, (2) such deadlock is one that 
cannot be resolved by the shareholders, and (3) the 
corporation is suffering from, or is threatened with, 
irreparable injury because of such deadlock. See tit. 
8 § 226(a)(2); Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, 
slip op. at 1-2; Miller, C.A. No. 2140-VCN, at *3.  
i. The First Requirement of Section 
226(a)(2) 
In determining if the directors are deadlocked, 
Delaware courts look to whether the board is so 
genuinely “divided respecting the management of the 
affairs of the corporation that a vote required for 
curative action by the board as a governing body 
cannot be obtained.” See Hoban vs. Dardanella Electric 
Corp., No. 7615, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jun. 12, 1984). 
Accordingly, disagreements over matters that are of 
critical importance to the corporation will weigh 
favorably in this determination. See Kleinberg vs. 
Aharon, C.A. No. 12719–VCL, at *12 (Del.Ch. Feb. 13, 
2017); Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 68-69. 
Examples of corporate matters of critical importance 
include questions over: the dissolution of the 
company, issuance of distributions, pursuit of 
acquisitions, director reimbursement, expense true-
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ups, undertaking a company audit, hiring and retention 
of personnel, employee and outside counsel 
compensation, and commercial leases. See Shawe I, C.A. 
No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 68-72.  
As an additional catchall category, the Delaware 
courts have also recognized director deadlock when the 
level of distrust between the directors “strikes at 
the heart of the palpable dysfunction that exists in 
the governance of the Company.” See id. at 70. For 
example, the Chancellor in Shawe I listed the 
following examples of factual situations in that case 
that bred distrust and dysfunction sufficient to 
support a finding of director deadlock: 
 
(1) Respondent engaged in a secret campaign to 
spy on Petitioner … and [entered] her locked 
office without permission on numerous occasions. 
(2) Respondent co-opted the services of company 
advisors … to assist him in advancing his 
personal agenda against Petitioner. 
(3) Respondent unilaterally hired numerous 
employees … without [Petitioner’s] knowledge or 
consent by creating “off book” arrangements and 
fabricating documents. 
(4) Respondent sought to have Petitioner 
criminally prosecuted by referring to her as his 
ex-fiancée seventeen years after the fact when 
filing a “Domestic Incident Report.” 
(5) Respondent disparaged Petitioner and tried 
to marginalize her within the Company by 
gratuitously disseminating a memorandum…to 
employees in her own division accusing her of 
collusion and financial improprieties. 
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(6)  Respondent disparaged Petitioner publicly by 
unilaterally issuing a press release in the 
company's name containing false and misleading 
statements. 
 
See C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 70. 
 
Director deadlocks must be genuine and not 
contrived. A petitioner cannot claim director deadlock 
if that deadlock is manufactured in bad faith by 
“refusing to consider any issue.” See Kleinberg, C.A. 
No. 12719–VCL, at *12 (rejecting the manufactured 
deadlock claim by finding that genuine deadlock 
resulted from lack of confidence and “legitimate 
disagreements about the direction of the Company and 
[defendant’s] role); Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip 
op. at 72. Additionally, Delaware courts have held 
that they will not recognize a deadlock “based upon a 
specious premise.” See Kleinberg, C.A. No. 12719–VCL, 
at *11; Francotyp-Postalia AG & Co. vs. On Target 
Tech., Inc., No. 16330 at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 24, 1998) 
(holding that when the dispute over which the director 
deadlock claim arose from is proven untrue, “there is 
no statutory basis to engage prematurely in an 
analysis” of Section  226(a)(2)).  
Aside from this principle, the court will 
generally recognize director deadlock when there is 
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evidence of “genuine, good faith divisions … of a 
fundamental and systemic nature” over how the 
corporation should be managed. See Kleinberg, C.A. No. 
12719–VCL, at *12; Shawe I., C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip 
op. at 72. 
ii. The Second Requirement of Section 
226(a)(2) 
 
In determining whether director deadlock can be 
resolved by the corporation’s shareholders, courts 
have held that this condition is one that “plainly 
exists” consistent with application of the shareholder 
deadlock statute.  See Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip 
op. at 78; Cf. Miller, C.A. No. 2140-VCN, at *4 (where 
the court expressed a similar sentiment concluding 
that the shareholder deadlock language of §226(a)(1) 
is “clear and unambiguous”). Additionally, in closely 
held corporations, the court has been explicit in 
holding that this requirement will clearly be met when 
the shareholders effectively serve as most, if not 
all, of the company’s directors. See Shawe I, C.A. No. 
9661-CB, slip op. at 78; Hoban, No. 7615, at *3. 
iii. The Third Requirement of Section 
226(a)(2) 
 
The final condition that must be satisfied before 
judicial intervention becomes an available remedy is 
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the question of whether irreparable injury is being 
threatened or suffered by the corporation. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2); Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, 
slip op. at 72. As a starting point, when genuine 
director deadlock cannot be broken, Delaware courts in 
application of their judicial intervention statute 
look to whether the threat of irreparable injury 
emanates from the identified director deadlock. See 
Niehenke vs. Right O Way Transp., Inc., Nos. Civ. A. 
14392, Civ. A. 14444, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 1995).  
In 2017, Delaware courts have twice reaffirmed 
the factors often considered when determining 
irreparable injury, including, “harm to a 
corporation's reputation, goodwill, customer 
relationships, and employee morale.” See Shawe II, No. 
423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 15; Kleinberg, 
C.A. No. 12719–VCL, at *13.  
A finding of irreparable injury need not be 
accompanied by immediate financial harm or insolvency. 
The fact that the company has been profitable is not 
dispositive. See Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. 
at 74-78 (holding that the level of profitability of a 
corporation does not factor into a determination of 
irreparable injury when the governance structure of 
 
 
25 
 
the corporation was found to be “irretrievably 
dysfunctional”). The mere fact that a corporation is 
profitable is not sufficient evidence of a lack of 
irreparable injury. Other factors may be sufficient 
for a finding of threatened or actual irreparable 
injury to a profitable corporation as a result of 
director deadlock. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. 
No. 9686, slip op. at 16. 
C. Guidance For Circumstances Under Which A 
Judge May Order The Sale Or Dissolution Of A 
Corporation 
 
While DGCL § 226 is a “custodial statute,” its 
reach extends to that of judicially ordered sale or 
dissolution. See tit. 8, § 226(a); Shawe II, No. 423, 
2016, C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 19-20 (rejecting 
respondent’s arguments that under Section 226, the 
court could not order a custodian to liquidate the 
company's affairs).  
In contemplating a judicially-mandated sale, the 
trial court in Shawe I considered among other things 
the appropriateness of (1) declining to appoint a 
custodian, thus leaving the parties to their own 
devices, (2) appointing a custodian to serve as a tie-
breaker vote in the governance of the corporation, or 
(3) appointing a custodian to sell the company so that 
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the shareholders could be separated and the business 
protected from their harmful relationship. See C.A. 
No. 9661-CB, slip op. at 80-81. The Chancellor held 
that while appointment of a custodian to sell a 
profitable corporation was unusual and only to be 
ordered as a last resort, the “dysfunction [of the 
directors] must be excised to safeguard the company” 
from the threat of irreparable injury.  See id. at 82.  
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
conclusion of the Chancery Court that the less-
intrusive measures contemplated would not have been 
effective given the level of distrust and “palpable 
[corporate] dysfunction” uncovered during trial. See 
Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 
9,12. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the 
petitioner’s plea that the court apply a more 
stringent “imminent corporate paralysis” standard when 
determining whether the corporation suffered or was 
threatened by irreparable injury. See id. at 15.  
Rather, the court noted that irreparable injury is “a 
familiar equitable principle that takes into account 
factors like ‘harm to a corporation’s reputation, 
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee 
morale.’” See id.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
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corporation was profitable, the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized that if the extremely dysfunctional 
relationship between the shareholders was permitted to 
persist that the corporation was “was likely to 
continue on the path of plummeting employee morale, 
key employee departures, customer uncertainty, damage 
to the Company’s public reputation and goodwill, and a 
fundamental inability to grow the Company through 
acquisitions.” See id. at 16.   
Delaware courts will exercise their dissolution 
powers when all three preconditions of the dissolution 
statute have been met, and it is deemed to be the only 
viable remedy left to protect the business and 
shareholder investment even when the corporation is 
still profitable. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. 
No. 9686, slip op. at 1; see also Shawe I, C.A. No. 
9661-CB, slip op. at 81 n.320 (citing cases where a 
Delaware court ordered the dissolution of profitable 
corporation, including Bentas vs. Haseotes, No. Civ.A. 
17223 NC (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003) (Bentas); Fulk vs. 
Washington Service Assoc., No. CIV.A. 17747-NC, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Jun. 21, 2002) (Fulk)).  
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V. DELAWARE’S JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION STATUTE FOR 
CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS CAN PROVIDE 
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE  
 
An examination of Delaware’s judicial dissolution 
statute for closely-held corporations may be valuable 
for this Court. Section 273 of the DGCL carves out a 
category for judicial dissolution of a corporation 
where (1) two fifty-percent shareholders, (2) are 
engaged in a joint venture and (3) are subsequently 
unable to agree upon the desirability of discontinuing 
such joint venture or the disposal of its assets. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (2017); Haley v. Talcott, 
864 A.2d 86, 94 (Del. Ch. 2004). This provision was 
added to the Delaware Code by the legislature in 1967
13
 
as part of a comprehensive effort to facilitate 
judicial resolution of intra-corporate deadlocks. See 
Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 237. 
Since its passage, courts have held that the 
statute acknowledges the uniqueness of a deadlock 
situation where a corporation is owned by only two 
equal shareholders. See In re English Seafood (USA) 
Inc., 743 F.Supp. 281, 288 (D. Del. 1990); Fulk, No. 
CIV.A. 17747-NC, at *12. In particular, it recognizes 
an equal shareholder’s right to protect their 
                                                 
13
 See 56 Del. Laws Ch. 50 (1967). 
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investment in the assets of a corporation from 
depletion or loss due to irreconcilable deadlock and 
the “resulting paralysis in the corporation’s ability 
to conduct business and fulfill the purpose for which 
it was created.” See Fulk, No. CIV.A. 17747-NC, at 
*12. 
Section 273’s explicit de-emphasis of the 
requirement to prove irreparable injury (by 
automatically granting eligibility for judicial 
dissolution) in fifty-percent shareholder deadlock 
cases reflects the policy protecting against the 
inevitable corporate paralysis that can arise in 50-50 
corporate structures. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, 
C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 27-28. In Shawe II, the 
Supreme Court reflected this policy by affirming the 
lower court’s reliance on § 273 cases to inform its 
judicial discretion under § 226. See id. at 22-23 
(holding that the Court of Chancery’s reliance on 
remedies entered under § 273 cases was justified 
because the corporation’s economic reality was 
“identical to a 50–50 deadlock, and that the tools 
used to sensibly address those deadlocks would inform 
[their] discretion under § 226.” See Shawe II, No. 
423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, slip op. at 23.  
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Under § 273, where there are two 50-50 
shareholders, Delaware courts treat such dissolution 
petitions much like no-fault divorces. Parties need 
only make showing of a deadlock and need not make any 
showing of irreparable injury in order to win a 
judicial order of dissolution. See In re Venture 
Advisers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 9439, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 1, 1988). 
By specifying that the two shareholders be equal 
in ownership of their joint venture, § 273 recognizes 
the potential for a perpetual state of deadlock in 
that type of corporate structure.  See In re Venture 
Advisers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 9439, at *3; Cf. Modlin v. 
Iselin, C.A. No. 8104, at *5 (Del.Ch.,1985) 
(recognizing that director deadlock normally proceeds 
on the assumption of equal stock ownership). This is 
evidenced by the court’s consistent promotion of this 
dissolution right for deadlocked shareholders.  See 
Matter of Bermor, Inc., C.A. No. 8401–VCL, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 9, 2015) (citing that Section 273 “exists to 
enable deadlocked shareholders to bring closure to 
what has become an inefficient and unworkable 
relationship”); Dionisi vs. DeCampli, No. 9425, at *7 
(Del. Ch. June 28,1995) (holding that this section 
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“embodies the public policy that … two [fifty-percent] 
stockholders should follow the procedures established 
by legislative enactment when the joint venture has 
come to an end”). 
Once the statutory requirements of § 273 have 
been met, Delaware courts limit their discretion (over 
denying judicial dissolution) to a brief determination 
of whether or not the inability to agree between the 
two shareholders is a bona fide one, in effect 
treating a dissolution petition like a no-fault 
divorce. See Matter of Bermor, Inc., C.A. No. 8401–
VCL, at *3 (quoting In re Arthur, No. CA 5357, at *4). 
When the court finds such genuine disagreement, the 
petitioner is entitled to judicial relief laid out by 
the statute. See In re Arthur, No. CA 5357, at *4. 
Thus, in the absence of a showing of bad faith (i.e. 
“manufactured deadlock”) relating to the seeking of a 
dissolution of the joint venture,
14
 the courts will 
treat the § 273 petition as if it were one for 
                                                 
14
 Delaware courts have consistently commented that a 
court may decline to grant a Section 273 petition when 
“the actual foundation for this action” is something 
other than genuine deadlock; such as illegality, 
fraud, violation of the corporate opportunity 
doctrine, or other breach of fiduciary duty.  See In 
re Food Ingredients Intern., Inc., No. 4422–VCP, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2010); In re Data Processing 
Consultants, Ltd., CIV.A. No. 8907, at *2. 
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voluntary dissolution and will order it. See Matter of 
Bermor, Inc., C.A. No. 8401–VCL, at *3; In re 
McKinney, No. CIV. A. 15071, at *7. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this brief, we have attempted to provide the 
court with additional perspective on the application 
of a comparable judicial intervention statute by the 
highest court of a sister state. In a recent 
application of that statute, the Delaware Supreme 
Court found that the trial court judge had not abused 
his discretion in ordering a sale of an otherwise 
profitable corporation after finding that directors 
were deadlocked and that the corporation was suffering 
and was threatened to suffer irreparable injury as a 
result. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, 
slip op. at 13 (where the Delaware Supreme Court 
applied the abuse of discretion standard); see also 
Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240 (judicial dissolution case 
where Delaware Supreme Court applied the abuse of 
discretion standard). As applied in Shawe II, this 
standard seems consistent with Massachusetts law. 
Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 
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505 (2011) (review of law and facts after bench 
trial); Zabin v. Picciotto, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 170 
(2008) (review of mixed questions of law and fact); 
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) 
(“a judge’s discretionary decision constitutes an 
abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made 
‘a clear error of judgment in weighing’ the factors 
relevant to the decision ... such that the decision 
falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.”). 
See also Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 
380 Mass. 609, 615-16 (1980) (review of Equity 
decrees).  
In the case presently before this Court, the 
trial judge held that while the disagreements between 
two fifty-percent shareholders “must be a difficult 
[situation] in which to function, I do not find that 
the parties are unable to function.” See Koshy vs. 
Sachdev, No. CV 12-2397, slip op. at 10 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 26, 2015) (Koshy).  With respect to 
“irreparable injury,” the trial judge in Koshy appears 
to have started from the premise that since the 
corporation continues to be profitable, there is no 
actual injury or threat of injury. See Koshy, No. CV 
12-2397, slip op. at 7 (where the trial judge found 
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that “in spite of those disagreements [between the two 
parties], the company has continued to function and to 
be profitable”). This premise appears to be consistent 
with the more stringent “imminent corporate paralysis” 
standard rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court and 
inconsistent with the factors Delaware courts would 
apply under its dissolution statute.  See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 226(a); Shawe I, C.A. No. 9661-CB, slip op. 
at 80-84. 
It is unclear to what extent the trial judge 
considered the corporation's dysfunction in charting 
business strategy for the future, and the level of 
distrust between its owners in assessing irreparable 
injury. See Shawe II, No. 423, 2016, C.A. No. 9686, 
slip op. at 15 (listing the factors Delaware courts 
consider when determining “irreparable injury”). To 
the extent the trial judge relied on evidence of 
profitability to reach his determination that the 
corporation was not irreparably injured (and to some 
extent, not deadlocked), such a conclusion may not be 
warranted. Indeed, such a stringent application of the 
irreparable injury standard against the facts 
demonstrating dysfunction in this case risks stripping 
§ 14.30 of any power at all.   
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This Court may decide that in the context of 
closely-held corporations where there are two fifty-
percent shareholders it is not appropriate to insist 
upon a stringent definition of irreparable injury that 
could consign a bitterly divided corporation and its 
shareholder-employees to an unending business 
purgatory merely because it is presently profitable.  
For these reasons, we urge that the Court clarify 
the law in this area and, in light of new legal 
guidance afforded by its opinion, consider remanding 
the case to the trial judge for further consideration 
as to true deadlock and the existence or threat of 
irreparable injury.  
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SEITZ, Justice, for the Majority: 
 
 
 
Philip Shawe and his mother, Shirley Shawe, have filed an interlocutory 
appeal from the Court of Chancery’s August 13, 2015 opinion and July 18, 2016 
order, and related orders, appointing a custodian under 8 Del. C. § 226 to sell 
TransPerfect Global, Inc., a Delaware corporation.  After a six-day trial filled with 
unprecedented evidence of a lengthy and seriously dysfunctional relationship 
between the owners, culminating in Philip Shawe’s litigation misconduct, the 
Court of Chancery issued a 104-page opinion concluding that the warring factions 
were hopelessly deadlocked as stockholders and directors.  The court carefully 
considered three alternatives to address the dysfunction and deadlock, and in the 
end decided that the circumstances of the case required the appointment of a 
custodian to sell the company. 
On appeal, the Shawes do not challenge the Court of Chancery’s many 
factual findings of serious dysfunction and deadlock.  Instead, Philip Shawe claims 
for the first time on appeal that the court exceeded its statutory authority when it 
ordered the custodian to sell a solvent company.  Alternatively, Shawe contends 
that less drastic measures were available to address the deadlock.  Shirley Shawe 
has taken a different tack, and argues for the first time on appeal that the 
custodian’s sale of the company might result in an unconstitutional taking of her 
one share of TransPerfect Global stock.   
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 We disagree with the Shawes and affirm the Court of Chancery’s judgment.  
First, under the custodian statute, the Court of Chancery may appoint a custodian 
when the stockholders are unable to elect directors whose terms have expired.  
Here, the parties stipulated that they were unable to do so.  Further, a custodian 
may be appointed when the corporation’s business is suffering from, or is 
threatened with, irreparable injury because of divisions between the directors, and 
the stockholders are unable to terminate the division.  Here, the director and 
stockholder deadlock are undisputed, and the Court of Chancery made detailed 
factual findings of threatened and actual irreparable harm to the company which 
we will not disturb on appeal.  We also agree with the Court of Chancery’s 
conclusion that, in circumstances such as this, when intermediate measures were 
attempted but failed, the Court of Chancery properly exercised its discretion to sell 
the company and distribute the proceeds to deadlocked stockholders.  
 Finally, Philip and Shirley Shawe have attempted to raise statutory and 
constitutional arguments that were not considered by the Court of Chancery.  
Under this Court’s long-standing rules and the important policy reasons guiding 
them, we do not consider arguments raised by the Shawes for the first time on 
appeal.  Our dissenting colleague has concluded, however, that even though the 
statutory argument was never considered by the Court of Chancery, it should be 
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addressed for the first time on appeal.  Thus, in response to the dissent, we explain 
why we disagree with its interpretation of the custodian statute.        
I. 
 TransPerfect Global, Inc. (“TPG”) is a Delaware corporation that acts as a 
holding company for the main operating company, TransPerfect Translations 
International, Inc. (“TPI”), a New York corporation.  Both entities will be referred 
to as the “Company.”  The Company provides translation, website localization, and 
litigation support services from 92 offices in 86 worldwide cities.  It has over 3,500 
full-time employees and maintains a network of over 10,000 translators, editors, 
and proofreaders in about 170 different languages.  Elting and Shawe co-founded 
the Company and are co-chief executive officers and board members.       
 TPG has 100 shares of common stock issued and outstanding, divided fifty 
shares to Elting, forty-nine shares to Shawe, and one share to Shirley Shawe.  In 
this Opinion, we refer to Philip Shawe as “Shawe,” and Shirley Shawe by her full 
name.  The one share allocated to Shirley Shawe allowed TPG to claim the benefits 
of being a majority women-owned business.  We credit the Court of Chancery’s 
finding, based on evidence introduced at trial, that Shawe “has treated his mother’s 
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share as his own property and himself as a 50% co-owner of the Company.”1  After 
a corporate reorganization in 2007, TPG’s bylaws provided for a three member 
board of directors, or a different number fixed by the stockholders.  Elting and 
Shawe have been the only directors since the Company’s reorganization in 2007.   
 To fully appreciate the personal nature of the long-running discord leading 
to the Court of Chancery’s ruling, we go back to the Company’s founding and the 
troubled romantic relationship between the founders.  Elting and Shawe co-
founded the business in 1992 while living together in a dormitory room attending 
New York University’s business school.  They were engaged in 1996, but Elting 
called the marriage off in 1997.  As the Court of Chancery found, “Shawe did not 
take the break-up well, and would ‘terrorize’ her and say ‘horrendous things’ about 
her husband, Michael Burlant, whom she married in 1999.”2  On two separate 
occasions, Shawe responded to the rejection by crawling under Elting’s bed and 
refusing to leave.3   
                                                 
1 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).  Elting 
demonstrated at trial that Shawe held a general proxy for Mrs. Shawe’s one share, and 
consistently held himself out as the 50% owner of TPG. Id. 
2 Id. at *3. 
3 When Elting ended their engagement, Shawe refused to leave the apartment and crawled under 
her bed and stayed there for at least half an hour. App. to Opening Br. at 2393 (Trial Tr.).  On 
another occasion, Elting was traveling alone in Buenos Aires looking for space to open a new 
office.  She arrived at her hotel room to find that Shawe had showed up unannounced.  When she 
asked him to leave, he crawled under her hotel bed and stayed there for about half an hour. Id. 
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 As the Company grew, the founders were not satisfied with their financial 
success, and brought their simmering personal discontent into the Company’s 
business affairs.  The Court of Chancery catalogued the serious clashes over the 
years between Shawe and Elting and their surrogates before, and remarkably, 
during the litigation: 
• Shawe engaged in a secret campaign to spy on Elting and invade her 
privacy by intercepting her mail, monitoring her phone calls, 
accessing her emails (including thousands of privileged 
communications with her counsel), and entering her locked office 
without permission on numerous occasions as well as sending his so-
called “paralegal” there at 4:47 a.m. on another occasion. 
 
• Shawe co-opted the services of Company advisors (e.g., Gerber and 
Kasowitz) to assist him in advancing his personal agenda against 
Elting. 
 
• Shawe unilaterally hired numerous employees to perform Shared 
Services functions (Accounting and Finance) and even to work in 
divisions Elting managed (Chris Patten in TRI) without her 
knowledge or consent by creating “off book” arrangements and 
fabricating documents. 
 
• Shawe sought to have Elting criminally prosecuted by referring to 
her as his ex-fiancée seventeen years after the fact when filing a 
“Domestic Incident Report” as a result of a seemingly minor 
altercation in her office. 
 
• Shawe disparaged Elting and tried to marginalize her within the 
Company by gratuitously disseminating a memorandum (on Gerber’s 
letterhead) to employees in her own division accusing her of collusion 
and financial improprieties. 
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• Shawe disparaged Elting publicly by unilaterally issuing a press 
release in the Company’s name containing false and misleading 
statements.4 
 
 These were just some of the highlights of the facts found by the Court of 
Chancery after a lengthy trial.  The court also made detailed findings about 
continuous acrimonious disputes over personal and business expenses, weekly if 
not daily temper tantrums, and “mutual hostaging” between the founders over 
proposed acquisitions, stockholder distributions, employee hiring, pay and 
bonuses, and office locations.  The court also found that Shawe bullied Elting and 
those aligned with her, expressing his desire to “create constant pain” for Elting 
until she agreed with Shawe’s plans.5  It was common for senior officers to be 
drawn into their disputes, who were then abused by threatened firings, substantial 
fines, inappropriate emails, and by withholding compensation and promotions.   
 Specific to the Company’s operations, the Court of Chancery heard days of 
testimony leading to findings that: 
• Elting refused to pay litigation counsel to defend significant ongoing 
patent infringement litigation. 
 
• Shawe fired real estate professionals, public relations professionals, 
refused to execute leases, and interfered with the Company’s payroll 
processes. 
 
                                                 
4 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *27 (internal citations omitted). 
5 Id. at *6. 
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• Shawe refused to engage in an annual expense true up, and 
interfered with the annual review of the Company’s financials and its 
audit process. 
 
•  Shawe falsified corporate records to avoid review by Elting. 
 
 The Court of Chancery best captured the lengths that Shawe would go to 
harass Elting in its recounting of Elting’s plane trip to Paris in 2014: 
 On December 2, 2014, Elting boarded a red eye flight to Paris 
and discovered, to her surprise, that Shawe was seated across the aisle 
from her.  Shawe claimed to have “no idea” she would be on the 
flight.  In truth, Shawe previously learned that Elting would be on the 
flight and made arrangements to be seated next to her without her 
knowledge.  Elting changed seats.  The next day, Shawe sent a text 
message to several of his allies, stating: “Was next to Liz on the plane 
to Paris and she switched seats ;).”  Two of the recipients of the text 
message were Nathan Richards and Joe Campbell, both of whom are 
implicated in events concerning Shawe’s alleged spoliation of 
evidence, which is the subject of a motion for sanctions discussed 
below. 
 I find Shawe’s characterization of the incident as an attempt to 
extend an olive branch not to be credible.  He did not deny telling 
Elting that he had “no idea” she would be on the flight, which was not 
true, and the smiley-face emoticon at the end of his text message 
suggests he was amused by yet another opportunity to harass Elting, 
who Shawe knew full well would not welcome his presence on the 
flight.6 
 
II. 
 While Shawe and Elting continued to harass each other, interfere with the 
business, and demoralize the employees, they filed four lawsuits against each 
                                                 
6 Id. at *23 (internal citations omitted). 
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other.7  The conflict eventually distilled down to Elting’s petition under 8 Del. C.  
§ 226 to declare a deadlock and appoint a custodian to sell TPG.   
The court dedicated enormous resources to the dispute.  It held twelve 
hearings, decided sixteen motions, and conducted a six-day trial.  Before its final 
decision, the Court of Chancery took the measured step of appointing a custodian 
to serve as a mediator to assist Shawe and Elting to try and settle their disputes.  
The court also delayed its post-trial decision for two months to await the parties’ 
ongoing efforts to resolve the controversy.  After the many attempts at settlement 
failed, the Court of Chancery issued its 104-page decision finding that “the 
evidence presented at trial warrants the appointment of a custodian to sell the 
Company to resolve the deadlocks between Shawe and Elting.”8   
 First, the Court of Chancery found that Elting had satisfied the requirements 
of § 226(a)(1) to appoint a custodian for stockholder deadlock because the parties 
stipulated that they were divided and unable to elect successor directors.  Next, the 
court held that Elting satisfied the three requirements of § 226(a)(2) for 
                                                 
7 On May 8, 2014, Elting filed an action in New York seeking to remove Shawe as a TPI 
director.  On May 15, 2014, she filed a verified petition for dissolution of Shawe & Elting LLC 
(Shawe and Elting’s joint owned asset protection and distribution vehicle) in the Court of 
Chancery.  On May 22, 2014, Shawe filed a verified complaint in the Court of Chancery 
individually and derivatively on behalf of TPG asserting claims against Elting for waste, breach 
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and indemnification.  On May 23, 2014, 
Elting filed a petition in the Court of Chancery seeking the appointment of a custodian to sell the 
Company, and dissolution of TPG under the court’s equitable powers.  Id. at *18. 
8 Id.  
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appointment of a custodian due to director deadlock.  As to the first requirement, 
the existence of deadlocks, the court reviewed in painstaking detail its many 
factual findings, now undisputed on appeal, supporting its conclusion that the 
distrust Shawe and Elting have for each other “strikes at the heart of the palpable 
dysfunction that exists in the governance of the Company.”9  The Court of 
Chancery also held that the second requirement, the stockholders’ inability to 
break the director deadlock, was satisfied by the parties’ stipulation of deadlock.         
 Turning to the final requirement, harm to the business, the Court of 
Chancery considered the profitability of the Company, but also made the 
commonsense observation that the statute contemplates appointment of custodians 
for profitable corporations which, like distressed companies, can suffer or be 
threatened with irreparable injury.  The court then catalogued some of the many 
examples of actual and threatened irreparable injury to the Company: 
• Kevin Obarski (Senior Vice President of Sales) called the feud the 
“biggest business issue” the Company faces, and bemoaned that the 
“crazy arbitrary stuff” coming out of it was “the number 1 reason 
people leave to go to work at competitors.” 
 
• Michael Sank (Vice President of Corporate Development) agreed: 
“it’s so obviously the biggest problem the company faces.” 
 
• Yu-Kai Ng (Chief Information Officer) identified as a Company 
goal in the wake of the 2013 Avengers meeting the need to find a way 
                                                 
9 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *27. 
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for Shawe and Elting to work together “without negatively impacting 
everyone else.” 
 
• Mark Hagerty (Chief Technology Officer) testified that the conflict 
“hurts company morale” and “is detrimental to the company.” 
 
• Robert DeNoia (former Vice President of Human Resources) 
expressed his frustration with the “pervasive and continuous hostile 
environment where inappropriate behavior impacts the morale, health 
and well-being of myself and the staff.” 
 
• Roy Trujillo (Chief Operating Officer), in a letter drafted for 
submission to a special master appointed in the New York action, 
attributed the “mass exodus” in Accounting and Finance to “the 
ongoing disputes and stressful environment created by it.”  He further 
stated that “[e]mployees are resigning and leaving these departments 
at unprecedented rates,” that “[t]he morale and retention issue will 
likely spread,” and that “[t]he company’s reputation is taking a 
beating, internally and externally.” 
 
• Kai Chu (an Accounting employee), attributed the “plummeting” 
morale and loss of employees in Accounting to the “diametrically 
opposed” orders that had been received from Shawe and Elting. 
 
• Fiona Asmah (a Finance employee) testified that the disputes and 
conflicting directives have caused her and others to feel “caught in the 
middle,” have created an “unhealthy work environment,” and have 
“affected employee morale.”10 
 
 Shawe himself acknowledged “the potential for grievously harming” the 
Company by his continued feuding with Elting.11  The Court of Chancery also 
found that major clients who are free to use competitive services have expressed 
concerns about the dispute.  Shawe and Elting have also been unable to agree on 
                                                 
10 Id. at *29 (internal citations omitted). 
11 Id. at *15 (internal citation omitted). 
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acquisitions which generally accounted for between 16.5-20% of the Company’s 
annual revenue and 8-14% of its annual net profit.  The Company has made no 
acquisitions since 2013.  As the Court of Chancery held: 
[A]lthough it is true that the Company is and has been a profitable 
enterprise to date, its governance structure is irretrievably 
dysfunctional.  The Company already has suffered from this 
dysfunction and, in my view, is threatened with much more grievous 
harm to its long-term prospects if the dysfunction is not addressed.12 
 
 When it came to the scope of the custodian’s authority, the Court of 
Chancery considered three alternatives.  First, the court could do nothing and 
“leave the parties to their own devices.”13  The court rejected this option because 
the “management of the Company is one of complete and utter dysfunction that is 
causing the business to suffer and threatens it with irreparable harm 
notwithstanding its profitability to date.”14  The Chancellor “found Elting’s distrust 
of Shawe to be justified” and “Shawe’s actions have cast a pall on the prospect that 
a third party would pay a fair price for her shares.”15  The court thus decided 
against the “do nothing” option because “equity will not suffer a wrong without a 
remedy.”16 
                                                 
12 Id. at *30. 
13 Id. at *31. 
14 Id. 
15 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31. 
16 Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 1985 WL 11546, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985), aff’d, 
497 A.2d 792, 1985 WL 188543 (Del. 1985) (TABLE)). 
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 Second, the court considered whether to appoint a custodian to serve as a 
third director or act in some capacity to break the ties between the two factions.    
He rejected this option because: 
[I]t would enmesh an outsider and, by extension, the Court into 
matters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of 
time.  Shawe and Elting are both relatively young.  Absent a 
separation, their tenure as directors and co-CEO’s of the Company 
could continue for decades.  It is not sensible for the Court to exercise 
essentially perpetual oversight over the internal affairs of the 
Company.17 
 
 This left the Court of Chancery with a final option—“appoint a custodian to 
sell the Company so that Shawe and Elting can be separated and the enterprise can 
be protected from their dysfunctional relationship.”18  The court recognized that the 
remedy was “unusual,” and “should be implemented only as a last resort and with 
extreme caution.”19  But after reviewing the statute and case law, the court 
determined that the Court of Chancery “has appointed custodians to resolve 
deadlocks involving profitable corporations and authorized them to conduct a sale 
of the corporation.”20  Further, the Chancellor held: 
Having conducted a six-day trial, decided at least sixteen motions, 
held numerous lengthy hearings, and considered carefully the 
documentary evidence and credibility of the witnesses along with the 
parties’ extensive submissions, the painfully obvious conclusion is 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n. 3 (Del. Ch. 2000) and Fulk v. Wash. Serv. 
Assocs., Inc., 2002 WL 1402273, *2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002)). 
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that Shawe and Elting need to be separated from each other in the 
management of the Company for its own good.  Their dysfunction 
must be excised to safeguard the Company.21 
 
III. 
 Shawe’s primary argument on appeal is that the court exceeded its statutory 
authority when it ordered the custodian to sell a solvent company.  Alternatively, 
Shawe argues that, even if the statutory authority existed to authorize the custodian 
to sell the Company, the Court of Chancery should have tried other measures to 
address the deadlock before resorting to a sale of the Company.  We find, however, 
that Shawe failed to raise his statutory argument in the Court of Chancery, and 
cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.  We also find that the Court of Chancery 
took a measured approach to the dispute, and only ordered the custodian to sell the 
Company after attempting less intrusive measures, and reasonably concluding 
other less intrusive measures would not be effective.  The court’s decision to 
appoint a custodian to sell the Company was supported by the facts found after 
trial, was permitted by the statute, and thus was not an abuse of discretion.22 
A. 
 The statute, 8 Del. C. § 226(a), provides that “[t]he Court of Chancery, upon 
application of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians, 
                                                 
21 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31. 
22 Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982) (applying abuse of discretion 
standard). 
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and, if the corporation is insolvent, to be receivers, of and for any corporation [].”  
As this prefatory language contemplates, custodians are appointed for solvent 
corporations, and receivers are appointed for insolvent corporations.   
 There are three pathways to appoint a custodian for a solvent corporation, 
two of which are relevant to this case.  First, a custodian may be appointed when: 
(1) At any meeting held for the election of directors the stockholders 
are so divided that they have failed to elect successors to directors 
whose terms have expired or would have expired upon 
qualification of their successors . . . .23 
 
 Or, a custodian may also be appointed when: 
(2) The business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with 
irreparable injury because the directors are so divided respecting 
the management of the affairs of the corporation that the required 
vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained and the 
stockholders are unable to terminate this division . . . .24 
 
 Shawe does not contest the Court of Chancery’s ruling that a custodian may 
be appointed under § 226(a)(1) due to the stockholder deadlock between Shawe 
and Elting, and their inability to elect successor directors.  Nor could he.  Shawe 
and Elting stipulated to the stockholder deadlock required by the statute.25 
 Shawe does challenge the Court of Chancery’s appointment of a custodian 
under § 226(a)(2), claiming that the court misapplied the requirement that the court 
                                                 
23 8 Del. C. § 226(a)(1). 
24 Id. § 226(a)(2). 
25 App. to Opening Br. at 3181-85 (Stipulation and Order). 
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find irreparable injury to the business of the corporation.  According to Shawe, the 
court improperly relied on case law defining irreparable injury in the temporary 
injunction context, instead of applying a supposedly more rigorous “imminent 
corporate paralysis” standard under § 226.  Shawe argues that applying the wrong 
standard “trivializes and undermines Section 226” because judicial intervention is 
only permitted in “extreme circumstances.”26  
 First, the argument is academic because Shawe agreed that the Court of 
Chancery was authorized to appoint a custodian under § 226(a)(1).  Elting need not 
show irreparable injury under the first part of the statute.27  Further, the Court of 
Chancery did not misapply the threatened or actual irreparable injury requirement.  
As the court observed, “irreparable injury” is “a familiar equitable principle” 
which takes into account factors like “harm to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, 
customer relationships, and employee morale.”28  Whether describing the standard 
as the Chancellor did, or as imminent corporate paralysis, it is a distinction without 
a difference.  This Court in Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp. used the same words 
interchangeably.29  The Court of Chancery properly applied the words of the 
                                                 
26 Shawe Opening Br. at 29. 
27 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (irreparable injury not required before appointing a custodian under 
§ 226(a)(1)). 
28 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. 
29 449 A.2d at 239 n.13 (describing “imminent corporate paralysis” as equivalent to “irreparable 
harm” when considering whether irreparable harm is required before appointment of custodian 
under § 226(a)(1)). 
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statute and settled principles of irreparable injury to evaluate the likelihood of 
threatened or actual irreparable injury to the Company’s business.   
 Far from trivializing the irreparable injury requirement, the Court of 
Chancery accepted the fact that the Company was profitable, but also recognized 
the extremely dysfunctional relationship between the founders and its effect on all 
of the Company’s operations.  If allowed to persist, the Company was likely to 
continue on the path of plummeting employee morale, key employee departures, 
customer uncertainty, damage to the Company’s public reputation and goodwill, 
and a fundamental inability to grow the Company through acquisitions.   
 We will not disturb these factual findings on appeal.  The trial record amply 
supports the Court of Chancery’s finding that the deadlock and dysfunction 
between the founders is causing threatened and actual irreparable injury to the 
Company.30           
B. 
 Having decided that the Court of Chancery properly exercised its discretion 
under § 226 to appoint a custodian of the Company, we turn to Shawe’s primary 
argument raised for the first time on appeal—that the custodian statute does not 
                                                 
30 Shawe also raises an unclean hands defense, claiming that Elting’s obstructionist conduct 
barred the appointment of a custodian.  The argument was not fairly presented to the Court of 
Chancery, and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only 
questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review; provided, however, that 
when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider and determine any question not 
so presented.”). 
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authorize the court to order the custodian to sell the Company over the 
stockholders’ objection.  Shawe also argues that instructing the custodian to sell 
the Company is an extreme remedy, and should not have been imposed without 
first attempting less-drastic remedies, such as using the custodian as a third director 
to break the ongoing deadlocks between the founders.   
For the important reasons expressed in Part IV of this Opinion, our Court 
requires that arguments be considered in the first instance by the trial court before 
appellate review.31  We have closely scrutinized Shawe’s record citations where he 
claims his statutory argument was raised below, and find each of his citations 
unconvincing or supporting the opposite conclusion.32  The argument is waived.  
                                                 
31 Supr. Ct. R. 8.  To avoid Rule 8, the dissent concludes that Shawe’s statutory argument was 
fairly encompassed within his general argument made below—that the Court of Chancery should 
not order a sale under Section 226. Dissent at 2, n.3. But Rule 8 is not satisfied by attempting to 
anchor serious appellate arguments in the shifting sands of general arguments made below.  As 
the following footnote demonstrates, Shawe not only failed to raise the statutory argument in the 
Court of Chancery, he took positions inconsistent with the dissent’s interpretation of § 226.  The 
Court of Chancery addressed a myriad of issues raised by eleven law firms, including Shawe’s 
litigation misconduct.  The statutory interpretation argument was not one of them.  The statutory 
interpretation argument “credibly can be avoided” because it was never presented to the Court of 
Chancery, and the Shawes took positions in the Court of Chancery contrary to those offered by 
the dissent for the first time on appeal.  See Dissent at 2, n.3.       
32 App. to Opening Br. at 3786-91 (Shawe Post-Trial Brief) (Court of Chancery should not 
appoint a custodian to sell the business because the statute “discourages dissolution” and 
“Delaware courts refuse to exercise their discretion to dissolve solvent companies where other 
measures ‘milder’ than dissolution are available.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 3836 (Shawe 
Answering Post-Trial Brief) (“Elting has not met the very high standard for appointment of a 
custodian to dissolve and sell the Company under Section 226” and “Dissolution is a last, not 
first resort.”); id. at 3850 (Shawe Answering Post-Trial Brief) (“There is no precedent for 
ordering dissolution because of one failed election of directors.”); id. at 3852-57 (Shawe 
Answering Post-Trial Brief) (attempting to distinguish case law but no mention of custodian’s 
lack of authority to sell the Company under § 226(b)); id. at 2382-83 (Shawe Answering Post-
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Even if the argument was properly before us, we find that the arguments relied 
upon by the dissent for the first time on appeal lack merit.33       
 Section 226(b) of the statute provides that: 
A custodian appointed under this section shall have all the powers and 
title of a receiver appointed under § 291 of this title, but the authority 
of the custodian is to continue the business of the corporation, and not 
to liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets, except when the Court 
shall otherwise order, and except in cases arising under paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section or § 352(a)(2) of this title.34 
 
 Section 394 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) provides 
that all corporations agree to make all provisions of the DGCL part of their 
charters.  Under the express language of the custodian statute, the Court of 
Chancery has the authority to “otherwise order” the custodian to “liquidate [the 
Company’s] affairs and distribute its assets” rather than “continue the business of 
the corporation.”35  In other words, the custodian’s default duty is to continue the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Trial Brief) (no argument made that § 226(b) precludes sale of the Company—only arguing that 
“Elting has provided no grounds” to dissolve the Company); id. at 3916-23 (Post-Trial Oral 
Argument) (arguing that the custodian’s authority should be “sharply limited” and “rarely, if 
ever,” appropriate under § 226 but no argument that the statute does not permit a sale, and 
describing sale as the “ultimate remedy”); id. at 4114-16 (Shawe’s Objections to Sale Report) 
(Shawe Answering Post-Trial Brief) (challenging custodian’s sale authority under an improper 
delegation argument, but not under § 226(b)).     
33 The dissent chides the majority for responding to the waived statutory interpretation 
arguments.  The dissent has, however, undertaken an exhaustive analysis of § 226, an analysis 
that we believe is mistaken.  Thus, we are obliged to point out why the waived argument has no 
merit. 
34 8 Del. C. § 226(b). 
35 Id. 
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business of the corporation, but the Court of Chancery can displace the default 
duty by ordering that the company’s affairs be liquidated.       
Several sources confirm the Court of Chancery’s broad authority under the 
statute, which includes ordering a sale.  As the court noted, the Court of Chancery 
has previously authorized a custodian to sell a company when faced with 
stockholder deadlock.36  This Court has also recognized the broad authority granted 
the Court of Chancery under the statute.  Section 226(b) provides that the 
custodian shall have “all the powers and title of a receiver appointed under             
§ 291.”37  Although we have cautioned that normally the custodian’s authority 
“should be kept to a minimum” and “should be exercised only insofar as the goals 
of fairness and justice . . . require,” we have also observed that the court’s broad 
                                                 
36 See Bentas, 769 A.2d at 73 n. 3 (ordering appointment of a custodian to resolve deadlock for a 
“solvent and profitable corporation”). The court authorized the custodian to auction the company 
in a later decision. Bentas v. Haseotoes, 2003 WL 1711856 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003).  See also 
Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *2, 10 (Court appointed a custodian to sell a corporation that had 
“consistently been profitable,” and found that “nowhere does the statute require that a sale under 
Section 273 must take the form of a piecemeal sale of the corporation’s assets.  Although Section 
273 permits such a sale, its language is equally consistent with a court-ordered sale of the entire 
business to a third party as a going concern.”); In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., 2015 WL 2455952 
(Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (ordering custodian to sell profitable company); Brown v. Rosenberg, 
1981 WL 7638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981) (Recognizing “that it is more likely than unlikely 
that a [c]ourt will end up appointing a receiver to liquidate a corporation where there are but two 
stockholders, both of whom own 50% of the corporation’s shares, when they are unable to agree 
on anything.”).  Although these examples involve actions where the parties eventually agreed the 
business should be liquidated or sold, they demonstrate the Court of Chancery’s exercise of its 
broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy to resolve a deadlock.  
37 8 Del. C. § 226(b). 
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authority to set a receiver’s duties under § 291 leads to the same conclusion for a 
custodian’s authority under § 226(b): 
We interpret this section [226(b)] as setting forth the maximum 
statutory limits on the powers of the custodian.  Section 291, to which 
§ 226(b) specifically refers, states: “the powers of the [receiver] shall 
be such and shall continue so long as the Court shall deem necessary.”  
Thus, under §§ 226 and 291, the Court of Chancery may determine 
the duration of the appointment and the specific powers to be 
conferred upon the custodian.38 
 
The dissent does not take issue with the express language of the statute that 
the custodian has all of the powers of a receiver under § 291.  Nonetheless, it 
appears to argue that a custodian is not empowered to exercise the powers of a 
receiver when the court “otherwise orders” that a deadlocked solvent company be 
sold.39  According to the dissent, even though the language “except as the Court 
shall otherwise order” directly modifies the phrase coming before it—“not to 
liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets”—and is followed by the words “and 
except”—the dissent argues that interpretive principles should be applied to require 
that the exception language be read to permit liquidation only in circumstances 
similar to § 226(a)(3) (corporations that have abandoned their business) and            
§ 352(a)(3) (custodians for close corporations). 
                                                 
38 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240. 
39 Dissent at 6-7, n.12; 23, n.63. 
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The problems with this interpretation of the statute are apparent.  The dissent 
attempts to change the plain meaning of the statutory language by invoking rules of 
statutory interpretation.  But if a statute is clear and unambiguous, “the plain 
meaning of the statutory language controls.”40  This is because “[a]n unambiguous 
statute precludes the need for judicial interpretation.”41   
Under a plain reading of § 226(b), the custodian has the powers of a receiver 
under § 291, and his duties are to continue the business unless the Court otherwise 
orders, and except under the special circumstances of abandoned businesses and 
close corporations.  Rules of interpretation should not be invoked to contort the 
plain language of a statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning.   
Further, the dissent’s interpretation also ignores the conjunctive words “and 
except.”  The statute cannot reasonably be read to express the three exceptions as a 
series of similar events.  Instead, when the words “and except” are given meaning, 
the statute is reasonably read to list three distinct exceptions to the custodian’s 
default duty to maintain the business—“except when the Court shall otherwise 
order;” and “except in cases arising under paragraph (a)(3) of this section;” or 
“§ 352(a)(2) of this title.”42      
                                                 
40 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932-33 (Del. 2007) (quoting Eliason v. 
Englehart, 733 A.2d  944, 946 (Del. 1999)). 
41 Id.  
42 8 Del. C. § 226(b). 
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The dissent also points to § 273, a section of the DGCL permitting 
dissolution of joint venture corporations when two 50% owner-stockholders are 
deadlocked.  In many instances, that statute has been employed to break a deadlock 
through a sale of the corporation under the auspices of the Court of Chancery and a 
fiduciary appointed by it for that purpose.43   Contrary to what the dissent contends, 
it is by no means unprecedented for the Court of Chancery to have to address the 
fate of a solvent Delaware corporation by setting up a fair process to have it sold as 
a going concern, when that outcome is necessary to best protect its constituencies.    
As the Chancellor observed, this case “was within a whisker” of § 273.44 
The only novelty here is that this case arises under § 226, because the economic 
and functional reality of the deadlock does not fall precisely under § 273.   But, 
consistent with the flexible and efficient design of the DGCL, § 226 allows the 
Court of Chancery to address this situation by using its power to deal with cases on 
a situational basis.  Rather than read the key language “except when the Court shall 
otherwise order” as having no significance, we read it consistently with the overall 
                                                 
43  See, e.g., Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *2, 10; Matter of Bermor, Inc., 2015 WL 554861, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2015) (appointing receiver);  In re Bermor, Inc., 2015 WL 7856593 (Del .Ch. 
Dec. 2, 2015) (ORDER) (order approving receiver’s plan of sale); see also Kortum v. Webasto 
Sunroofs Inc., 769 A.2d 113 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2000) (noting that “if the Section 273 action 
proceeds to a conclusion, it is possible that . . . all of [the company’s] outstanding shares will be 
sold at a public auction.”). 
44 App. to Opening Br. at 2911 (Trial Tr.) (“It’s interesting, this case is within a whisker of a 273 
case where that would not be a very unremarkable request to make.  And obviously, the Court 
has enormous equitable discretion, but it’s practical.”). 
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design of the statute, and its intention to allow our Court of Chancery the discretion 
to deal sensibly with corporations that are unable to move forward with 
governance because their owners cannot take fundamental action to elect a new 
board.  That the Chancellor looked for guidance to the remedies entered in cases 
under § 273 was not error on his part.  Instead, it suggests that the court understood 
TPG’s economic reality as identical to a 50-50 deadlock, and that the tools used to 
sensibly address those deadlocks would inform his discretion under § 226. 
It is also not convincing to characterize the method chosen by the Chancellor 
as somehow different for purposes of § 226 because it involves a sale of the 
corporation’s stock, rather than its underlying assets.  Stockholders of Delaware 
corporations are only entitled to the rights that come with their stock, and those 
rights are subject to the Court of Chancery’s power under statutes like § 226.45   
Many Delaware statutes, including those dealing with certain mergers, subject 
stockholders to giving up their shares over their objection.    
When a stockholder buys stock in a Delaware corporation, it knows that our 
statute provides the Court of Chancery broad authority to address corporate 
deadlocks of various kinds, authority that may well affect fundamental ownership 
interests.  Stockholders buy stock in Delaware corporations to gain from the 
underlying operations of the corporation.  It is therefore inconsistent with the 
                                                 
45 8 Del. C. § 394. 
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practical and efficient design of corporate law in the DGCL, to require asset sales 
and liquidations, simply to allow stockholders to hold their paper shares and 
receive a final, and likely lower, liquidating dividend.   Nor is it the case that sales 
of corporate assets or of the entire corporation are somehow unusual when the 
corporation in managerial deadlock is profitable.  The reality is that most of the 
cases in which the Court of Chancery has ordered a sale or its equivalent in the 
context of § 273 dealt with profitable corporations.46  Those are the corporations 
that parties tend to fight over, especially in the Court of Chancery, because most 
insolvent corporation cases are handled by federal bankruptcy courts.  Parties 
intractably deadlocked will rarely want what the dissent characterizes as a lesser 
remedy like asset sales and dissolution. 
This case illustrates that reality well.  Here, making a distinction between 
liquidation and sale has no real practical effect.  TPG acts as a holding company 
for the main wholly-owned operating company, TPI, and other subsidiaries.  If we 
accepted Shawe’s interpretation of § 226(b), after remand the Court of Chancery 
                                                 
46 The dissent points out that in the cases relied on by Elting, the stockholders did not object to 
the corporation’s sale.  See, e.g., In re Supreme Oil Co., 2015 WL 2455952 (Del. Ch. May 22, 
2015 (ORDER); EB Trust v. Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 9443 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2014) 
(ORDER); Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); Bentas, 1999 WL 1022112 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 5, 1999).  But the absence of cases where stockholders object to a company sale is not 
surprising, when the alternative remedy within the Court of Chancery’s discretion is a liquidation 
of the corporation’s assets.  As noted above, it would be the rare case when the shareholders 
would engage in self-defeating behavior by giving up the value of a successful business’s 
goodwill and other intangible assets in favor of a liquidation of its physical assets.     
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could exalt form over substance and order TPG’s assets—TPI and other subsidiary 
companies—liquidated through a sale process, and the proceeds distributed to TPG 
and then its stockholders.  Shawe concedes as much.47   Such meaningless 
corporate shuffling illustrates why a reasonable reading of the statute includes a 
custodian’s authority to sell TPG instead of its parts.  Neither Elting nor Shawe 
want an asset sale, and for good reason.  Selling TPG as a going concern will 
protect TPG’s employees from the ruinous consequences of an asset sale and 
provide the maximum return to the stockholders.48   
 Shawe also faults the Court of Chancery for ordering a sale instead of 
experimenting with less-intrusive measures.  We agree with Shawe that a sale is a 
remedy to be employed reluctantly and cautiously, after a consideration of other 
options.  The Court of Chancery should always consider less drastic alternatives 
before authorizing the custodian to sell a solvent company.  But the remedy to 
address the deadlock is ultimately within the Court of Chancery’s discretion.49  The 
court did not abuse its discretion in this case.     
                                                 
47 Shawe Opening Br. at 18-19 (“Section 226(b) . . . provides for continuation of the business or 
liquidation or distribution of the corporation’s assets . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); see also App. to 
Opening Br. at 3786-91 (Shawe Pre-Trial Brief) (arguing that, under the facts of this case, the 
Court “should not dissolve the Company pursuant to its equitable powers.”). 
48 The dissent has no substantive response to the reality set forth above, except to claim that the 
point was not conceded by the Shawes and “[n]o party during this appeal has even suggested that 
either a liquidation or a sale of assets is an option.” Dissent at 6-7, n.12. 
49 Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 175 (Del. 2002) 
(“This Court reviews the Court of Chancery’s fashioning of remedies for abuse of discretion.”). 
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 First, the court attempted other less intrusive measures by appointing a 
custodian immediately after trial ended to serve “as a mediator to assist Elting and 
Shawe in negotiating a resolution of their disputes.”50  Almost three months later, 
after the first attempt at mediation failed, the court gave the parties another month 
before issuing its post-trial opinion “to afford them additional time to seek to 
resolve their disputes through the auspices of the mediator.”51  The Court of 
Chancery was also aware of repeated efforts to resolve the dispute in New York, 
including settlement discussions, a mediation, and multiple sessions with a court-
appointed Special Master.  The Court of Chancery gave the parties every 
opportunity to resolve their acrimonious dispute outside the courthouse. 
 Further, the court considered whether to appoint a custodian “to serve as a 
third director or some form of tie-breaking mechanism in the governance of the 
Company.”52  But the court rejected this option because: 
[I]t would enmesh an outsider, and, by extension, the Court into 
matters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of 
time.  Shawe and Elting are both relatively young.  Absent a 
separation, their tenure as directors and co-CEOs of the Company 
could continue for decades.  It is not sensible for the Court to exercise 
essentially perpetual oversight over the internal affairs of the 
Company.53 
 
                                                 
50 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *25. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at *31. 
53 Id. 
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And, although Shawe characterizes the Chancellor’s remedy as extremely 
intrusive, the appointment of a custodian to act as a constant monitor and tie-
breaker—which is what would be required given the abundant record that Shawe 
and Elting cannot work together constructively—would itself be expensive, 
cumbersome, and very intrusive.  Moreover, that approach would not facilitate, as 
the Chancellor’s ruling does, the ability of the Company to capitalize on its 
business model in the efficient, flexible way that commerce demands.  By 
preserving the Company as a whole in his remedy and allowing it to be owned and 
managed in the manner required to take advantage of evolving opportunities and to 
meet challenges effectively, the Chancellor’s remedy also was well designed to 
protect the other constituencies of the Company—notably its employees—by 
positioning the company to succeed and thus to secure the jobs of its workforce. 
 The Chancellor was in the best position to assess the viability of options 
short of sale.  Aware of the “extreme caution” that must be exercised before 
ordering a sale, he nonetheless determined that “the painfully obvious conclusion 
is that Shawe and Elting need to be separated from each other in the management 
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of the Company.  Their dysfunction must be excised to safeguard the Company.”54  
We will not second-guess that first-hand judgment on appeal.55        
IV. 
 For the first time on appeal, Shirley Shawe raises a novel argument that the 
Court of Chancery lacked the authority to order TPG’s sale.  Specifically, she 
alleges that the possibility that she would have to sell her share violates the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses of the United States and Delaware Constitutions.  
Shirley Shawe admits that she did not properly present this issue before the Court 
of Chancery.56 
 Under Supreme Court Rule 8, this Court only considers questions fairly 
presented to the trial court.57  The rule provides a narrow exception “if [this Court] 
finds that the trial court committed plain error requiring review in the interests of 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Shawe makes two other arguments on appeal, which we find without merit.  First, Shawe 
claims that by ordering a sale, Elting will receive a “control premium” that she could only 
receive through a contract, such as a buy-sell agreement.  The Court of Chancery correctly 
rejected this argument, reasoning that “the provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
including those afforded under section 226, apply by default,” and thus the existence of a control 
premium shared by all the stockholders is irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at *32.  Shawe also 
claims that the court’s privilege rulings were erroneous.  We need not evaluate the Court of 
Chancery’s privilege rulings to find that the court properly considered as part of its analysis how 
Shawe obtained the documents without Elting’s consent.  Shawe instructed a surrogate to break 
into Elting’s office and copy documents from her computer.  Privileged or not, Shawe’s conduct 
was reprehensible and confirmed the court’s conclusion that a custodian was necessary to sell the 
Company instead of some measure short of a sale, doomed to fail.      
56 Shirley Shawe Opening Br. at 4. 
57 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
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justice.”58  This standard has been applied in both criminal and civil cases.59  We 
have previously refused to review constitutional arguments raised for the first time 
on appeal.60   
“When reviewing for plain error, ‘the error complained of must be so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the 
trial process.’”61  “Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material 
defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and 
fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a 
                                                 
58 Smith v. Del. State Univ., 47 A.3d 472, 479 (Del. 2012).  This Court has previously used a 
different standard, which Shirley Shawe characterizes as a three part test: (1) “whether the issue 
is outcome-determinative and may have significant implications for future cases”; (2) whether 
the Court’s “consideration of the issue will promote judicial economy because it will avoid the 
necessity of reconsidering the [issue],” (e.g., Sandt v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., 640 A.2d 1030, 
1034 (Del. 1994)); and (3) when a question of public policy is involved relating to constitutional 
guarantees, Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199, 202 (Del. 1950).  That standard is much less 
frequently used, especially in our more recent cases, and Shirley Shawe cannot explain why we 
should prefer it to the more typically applied plain error standard. 
59 Smith, 47 A.3d at 479 (applying plain error standard in civil case); Sheehan v. Oblates of St. 
Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1255 (Del. 2011) (same); Estate of Swan v. Balan, 956 A.2d 
1222, 1227 (Del. 2008) (same); Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bailey, 913 A.2d 543, 555 (Del. 2006) 
(same); Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891, 897 (Del. 2005) (same); Potter v. Blackburn, 850 A.2d 
294, 297 (Del. 2004) (same); Duphily v. Del. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 832 (Del. 1995) 
(same); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Del. 1991) (same). 
60 See Cassidy v. Cassidy, 689 A.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Del. 1997) (stating that interests of justice 
did not require court to consider whether a statute was unconstitutionally vague or whether the 
court engaged in unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority). But see Turner v. State, 5 
A.3d 612 (Del. 2010) (interests of justice required the Court to review whether the trial judge left 
the courtroom before the defense finished closing argument because, if true, the trial judge’s 
behavior would have “jeopardize[d] the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”) (quoting 
Wainright, 504 A.2d at 1100)). 
61 Smith, 47 A.3d at 479 (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
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substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”62  As one learned 
treatise states:  
It is axiomatic that an appellate court will generally not review any 
issue not raised in the court below.  This rule is based on the principle 
that it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule 
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.  
Furthermore, it is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in 
the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable 
outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the 
trial court is unfavorable.63 
 
 Opponents should have a fair chance to address arguments at the trial court.  
It is prudent for the development of the law that appellate courts have the benefits 
that come with a full record and input from learned trial judges.  Thus, fair 
presentation facilitates the process by which the application of rights in an 
individual case affects others in other cases and society in general. 
 Shirley Shawe urges this Court to consider her new argument under the 
interests of justice exception because the ruling will have significant implications 
for future cases.  But that is exactly why we should not address her argument.  The 
record is largely undeveloped, the trial judge did not have the opportunity to make 
a thoughtful ruling, and Shirley Shawe’s briefs only cursorily address the issue.  
Because this Court takes such complex constitutional issues seriously, and because 
we cannot see how it was plain error for the Court of Chancery to, without 
                                                 
62 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
63 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 618 (2016) (citations omitted). 
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prompting from the eleven different law firms representing the Shawes’ interests in 
this litigation, fail to assess Shirley Shawe’s novel takings argument, we consider 
the constitutional arguments waived for failure to raise them first in the Court of 
Chancery. 
 Finally, Shirley Shawe argues that the Court of Chancery erred when it 
dismissed with prejudice the derivative claims brought against Elting.  Shawe has 
not appealed the dismissal with prejudice.  We agree with the Court of Chancery 
that Shirley Shawe’s active participation in two of the three “coordinated and 
functionally consolidated” actions before the Court of Chancery put her on notice 
that the claims could be dismissed based on Shawe’s unclean hands.  The court 
also found that Shawe functionally represented Shirley Shawe’s ownership interest 
in the Company.  Thus, she is bound by the dismissal with prejudice of the 
derivative claims brought by Shawe.  
V. 
 The Court of Chancery’s August 13, 2015 opinion and July 18, 2016 order, 
and the related orders, are affirmed.  
VALIHURA, Justice, dissenting: 
The Court of Chancery generally has broad discretion in fashioning certain 
equitable remedies.1  Although this might suggest that this Court should defer to 
the Chancellor who ordered one of the most extreme remedies possible—a sale of 
a financially successful corporation over the objections of one or more of its three 
stockholders—our review of the Court of Chancery‟s order requires construction 
of a statute, namely, 8 Del. C. § 226 (“Section 226”).  Embedded in this choice of 
remedy is the question of whether a court-appointed custodian has the power to 
force the sale of a stockholder‟s stock absent that stockholder‟s consent.  The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo.2  My 
analysis of the statutory scheme suggests that the answer is “no.”  Accordingly, I 
                                                          
1 The Court of Chancery has broad discretion, for example, in fashioning a remedy for a 
fiduciary violation, and the propriety of such a remedy is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  See Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 139 (Del. 2009) (en banc).  But, here, 
there were express findings post-trial that there were no breaches of fiduciary duty.  See, e.g., In 
re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *34 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (“In sum, the 
asserted acts of misconduct committed by Shawe that Elting has identified—although disturbing 
and contrary to expected norms of behavior—do not establish the very high level of fiduciary 
misconduct resulting in harm to the Company or its stockholders (in their capacity as 
stockholders) necessary to impose the remedy of equitable dissolution.”).  Instead, the Court of 
Chancery was fashioning a remedy pursuant to Section 226, where this Court has held that the 
intrusion into the business of the corporation must be kept to a minimum.  See Giuricich v. 
Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982). 
2 Corvel Corp. v. Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., 112 A.3d 863, 868 (Del. 2015); see also N. River 
Ins. Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 105 A.3d 369, 380-81 (Del. 2014)  (“[W]e do not defer 
to the trial court on embedded legal conclusions and review them de novo.” (citations omitted)), 
as revised (Nov. 10, 2014). 
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respectfully DISSENT.3 
Given that we are faced with a question as to the permissible limits of the 
Court of Chancery‟s power under Section 226, the flexibility typically afforded the 
Court of Chancery in fashioning equitable remedies must yield to the more specific 
principles underlying the relevant statutory provisions and common law 
interpreting these provisions.4  The first principle concerns the uncontested fact 
that, in the DGCL, stock is “personal property” and is generally subject to 
traditional property law policies favoring free alienation.5  Generally, where the 
                                                          
3 Much of the Majority Opinion addresses the Court of Chancery‟s power to appoint a 
custodian—a proposition that is not seriously contested by anyone here.  Rather, it is the 
Modified Auction‟s forced sale provisions that are chiefly at issue.  As to that main issue, the 
Majority declines to formally address the key statutory arguments on the grounds of waiver.  
Instead, they offer several pages of pure dicta on the issue.  I believe that the statutory arguments 
are fairly encompassed within Shawe‟s explicit argument below—that the Court of Chancery 
should not order a sale under Section 226.  Clearly, Section 226 and its proper scope have been a 
central focus all along.  Given that fact, I do not see how a statutory analysis credibly can be 
avoided.  See, e.g., N. River, 105 A.3d at 382-83 (rejecting a Rule 8 challenge and allowing 
additional reasoning to be presented in support of a “broader issue” that had been raised); Mundy 
v. Holden, 204 A.2d 83, 87 (Del. 1964) (“[W]hen the argument is merely an additional reason in 
support of a proposition urged below, there is no acceptable reason why in the interest of a 
speedy end to litigation the argument should not be considered.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
4 See, e.g., STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 1137 n.2 (Del. 1991) (“Again, we 
emphasize that our courts must act with caution and restraint when granting equitable relief in 
derogation of established principles of corporate law.” (citing Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 
A.2d 255, 258 (Del. 1991))).  Even under an “abuse of discretion” standard of review, the trial 
court‟s discretion is not unlimited.  See, e.g., 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies:  Damages-
Equity-Restitution 118 (2d ed. 1993) (“With the equitable remedy, the injunction should restore 
the plaintiff to her entitlement, no more, no less.”). 
5 See 2 Drexler, Black & Sparks, Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 22.01 at 22-2 
(2015) (“[C]orporate stock is personal property,” and “[t]he free alienability of personal property 
is a valuable attribute of property ownership worthy of protection by the courts.”); 12 Fletcher 
Cyc. Corps. § 5452 (Sept. 2016) (“The owner of the shares, as in the case of other personal 
property, has an absolute and inherent right, as an incident of his or her ownership, to sell or 
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possibility of defeasance of a stockholder‟s stock may occur over the stockholder‟s 
objection, those restraints on free transferability and alienation of stock are 
expressly set forth in the relevant statute.  That fact strongly suggests that Section 
226 should not be so broadly read as to allow for a forced sale or other divestiture 
of a stockholder‟s stock by mere implication.  The second principle is the long-
standing, uncontested common law principle that the involvement of the Court of 
Chancery and court-appointed custodians in a corporation‟s business and affairs 
should be kept to a minimum.6  This long-standing common law view is reflected 
in the fact that the parties here cannot point to a single case in the history of our 
Section 226 jurisprudence where a court has ordered a custodial sale of a company 
over a stockholder‟s objections.  These specific policies should be the analytical 
focal point in construing Section 226 and the permissible limits of the trial court‟s 
power.7 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transfer the shares at will, except insofar as the right may be restricted by the articles of 
incorporation, bylaws, an agreement among shareholders, or between shareholders and the 
corporation.”).   
6 See, e.g., Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240. 
7 We followed this statute-oriented approach, for example, in Berger, where we considered 
“what remedy [was] appropriate in a „short form‟ merger under 8 Del. C. § 253, where the 
corporation‟s minority stockholders [were] involuntarily cashed out without being furnished 
[with] the factual information material to an informed shareholder decision whether or not to 
seek appraisal.”  Berger, 976 A.2d at 133.  In evaluating four possible alternative remedies, this 
Court stated that “the optimal alternative would be the remedy that best effectuates the policies 
underlying the short form merger statute (Section 253), [and] the appraisal statute (Section 
262) . . . , taking into account considerations of practicality of implementation and fairness to the 
litigants.”  Id. at 140.  Likewise, the focus here should be on proper construction of Section 226 
in resolving the question of the scope of the Court of Chancery‟s power.  
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The appellants add a constitutional gloss on appeal that was not raised 
below, namely, they contend that a forced sale of their stock might well constitute 
an unconstitutional “taking” of their personal property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Delaware Constitution.  They contend that in order to avoid this potential 
constitutional problem, Section 226 ought to be construed more narrowly in favor 
of the implementation of less drastic remedies.  The “takings” argument presents 
novel issues of first impression, which I would not reach.   
A holistic reading of the DGCL supports the view that divestiture of a 
stockholder‟s stock may occur over the stockholder‟s objection in a number of 
situations—but only when the relevant statute expressly so provides.8  Examples 
where a stockholder is forced to give up her shares have one thing in common—
the relevant statutory provisions expressly contemplate that situation and provide 
fair notice that it may occur.  Here, Section 226 contains no such express provision 
or notice of such potential forced divestiture.  I know of no situations in the DGCL 
where a forced sale of stock can occur absent fair notice, and the Majority cites to 
none.  The absence of authority grounded in the statute, the conceded absence of 
any similar cases under Section 226, and our common law‟s strong preference for 
the least intrusive remedies in cases involving court-appointed custodians suggest 
                                                          
8 See Grimes v. Alteon Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 260 (Del. 2002) (en banc) (“One must read in pari 
materia the relevant provisions of the Corporation Law.” (italics added)). 
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that the Chancellor went too far too fast in ordering the Modified Auction.   
I. 
The Statutory Scheme Suggests that the Court of Chancery 
Lacked the Power to Order Stockholders to Sell Their Shares 
In its current form, Section 226(a) permits the Court of Chancery to appoint 
a custodian in the event of stockholder deadlock, director deadlock, or 
abandonment of the corporation: 
The Court of Chancery, upon application of any stockholder, may 
appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians and, if the corporation is 
insolvent, to be receivers, of and for any corporation when: 
 
(1) At any meeting held for the election of directors the 
stockholders are so divided that they have failed to elect 
successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have 
expired upon qualification of their successors; or 
 
(2) The business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened 
with irreparable injury because the directors are so divided 
respecting the management of the affairs of the corporation that 
the required vote for action by the board of directors cannot be 
obtained and the stockholders are unable to terminate this 
division; or 
 
(3) The corporation has abandoned its business and has failed 
within a reasonable time to take steps to dissolve, liquidate or 
distribute its assets.9 
 
In the case of shareholder deadlock, as here, “[t]he decision to appoint a 
custodian . . . is committed to the [c]ourt‟s discretion” and does not require a 
                                                          
9 8 Del. C. § 226(a). 
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showing of irreparable injury to the corporation.10   
Section 226(b) sets forth the authority of the custodian and states that the 
custodian‟s authority is to continue the business of the corporation and not to 
liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets: 
A custodian appointed under this section shall have all the powers and 
title of a receiver appointed under § 291 of this title, but the authority 
of the custodian is to continue the business of the corporation and not 
to liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets, except when the Court 
shall otherwise order and except in cases arising under paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section or § 352(a)(2) of this title.11 
In the event of a court-ordered liquidation, the custodian takes custody of the assets 
of the corporation—not of the stockholder‟s stock (which is the stockholder‟s 
personal property).12  Section 159 of the DGCL provides that “[t]he shares of stock 
                                                          
10 Miller v. Miller, 2009 WL 554920, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009), as revised (Feb. 17, 
2009). 
11 8 Del. C. § 226(b) (emphasis added).  Section 291, which governs receivers for insolvent 
corporations, provides: 
Whenever a corporation shall be insolvent, the Court of Chancery, on the 
application of any creditor or stockholder thereof, may, at any time, appoint 1 or 
more persons to be receivers of and for the corporation, to take charge of its 
assets, estate, effects, business and affairs, and to collect the outstanding debts, 
claims, and property due and belonging to the corporation, with power to 
prosecute and defend, in the name of the corporation or otherwise, all claims or 
suits, to appoint an agent or agents under them, and to do all other acts which 
might be done by the corporation and which may be necessary or proper.  The 
powers of the receivers shall be such and shall continue so long as the Court shall 
deem necessary. 
Id. § 291. 
12 In a liquidation under Section 226(b), the corporation‟s property is sold.  The stockholders 
continue to own shares, but the corporation is no longer a going concern, and its operating assets 
are replaced with cash.  Liquidation is available by court order and when a corporation has 
abandoned its business, is insolvent, or needs to wind up its affairs—circumstances 
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in every corporation shall be deemed personal property and transferable as 
provided in Article 8 of subtitle I of Title 6.”13  This Court, in Grimes v. Alteon,14 
stated that “[s]hares of stock are „a species of property right‟ that is of 
„foundational importance to our economic system.‟”15    
Although the powers of the custodian under Section 226 are defined by 
reference to Section 291, as this Court has stated, Section 226 powers “are not as 
unlimited as the powers of a receiver appointed under the general equitable powers 
of the court, or under the forerunner to the present [Section] 226(a)(1).”16  Nor 
does Section 291 grant the receiver power over the personal property of the 
stockholders, although a receiver may sell the property of the corporation under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unquestionably not present here.  Thus, I disagree with the Majority‟s statement that “in the 
context of this case, making a distinction between liquidation and sale has no real practical 
effect.”  Majority Op. at 24.  The Majority further suggests that, after remand, the Court of 
Chancery could order TPG‟s assets liquidated through a sale process and distribute the proceeds 
to the stockholders.  Id. at 25.  It further contends that “Shawe concedes as much.”  Id. (citing 
Opening Br. of Philip R. Shawe at 18-19).  Shawe‟s statements cannot be fairly viewed as a 
concession that liquidation was an option here.  No party during this appeal has even suggested 
that either a liquidation or a sale of assets is an option.  
13 8 Del. C. § 159. 
14 804 A.2d 256 (Del. 2002). 
15 Id. at 262 (internal omission removed) (quoting Kalageorgi v. Victor Kamkin, Inc., 750 A.2d 
531, 538 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
16 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 237; see also id. at 240 (holding in that case that the powers of the 
custodian “shall be sharply limited”).  Indeed, the default statutory obligation under Section 226 
is to continue the business and not to liquidate its affairs or distribute its assets.  The Majority, in 
focusing on the reference to powers under Section 291, ignores the limitation on that power 
which immediately follows that reference—which is “but the authority of the custodian is to 
continue the business . . . .”  8 Del. C. § 226(b).  I address the exceptions to that default statutory 
rule in footnote 52. 
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certain circumstances.17 
Review of the relevant statutory scheme suggests that it is unlikely that the 
General Assembly intended to permit a stockholder‟s fundamental personal 
property rights to be abridged by mere implication.  Where the DGCL does so 
permit restrictions on the stockholder‟s free transferability and alienation of her 
stock, including forced dispositions and transfers of stock ownership, it does so 
expressly.  Examples include Section 251(c) (permitting approval of mergers by a 
majority of stockholders, such that dissenting stockholders are divested of their 
stock subject only to appraisal rights under Section 262); Section 273 (authorizing 
dissolution of a joint venture owned by two 50% stockholders); and Section 303(a) 
(involving actions that may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings that are deemed to 
be unanimous actions of the stockholders). 
As to the first of these examples, the DGCL contemplates the conversion of 
shares when corporations merge.18  Section 251 of the DGCL governs mergers.  
Subsections 251(b) and (c) set forth requirements that a merger agreement must 
satisfy.  Section 251(b)(5), for example, provides that a merger agreement shall 
                                                          
17 See 8 Del. C. § 297. 
18 Id. § 251(c) (“If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon 
shall be voted for the adoption of the [merger] agreement, that fact shall be certified on the 
agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation, provided that such 
certification on the agreement shall not be required if a certificate of merger or consolidation is 
filed in lieu of filing the agreement.  If the agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each 
constituent corporation, it shall then be filed and shall become effective, in accordance 
with § 103 of this title.” (emphasis added)). 
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state: 
The manner, if any, of converting the shares of each of the constituent 
corporations into shares or other securities of the corporation or 
resulting from the merger or consolidation, or of cancelling some or 
all of such shares, and, if any shares of any of the constituent 
corporations are not to remain outstanding, to be converted solely into 
shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation or 
to be cancelled, the cash, property, rights or securities of any other 
corporation or entity which the holders of such shares are to receive in 
exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares and the surrender of 
any certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or 
securities of any other corporation or entity may be in addition to or in 
lieu of shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting 
corporation[.]”19 
Section 251(c) requires that the merger agreement required by subsection (b) 
be submitted to the stockholders at an annual or special meeting “for the purpose 
of acting on the agreement.”20  It also sets forth notice requirements.  Because the 
power to merge is expressly conferred by statute, every stockholder of a Delaware 
corporation accepts his or her shares with notice of these provisions.  Though a 
stockholder might be able to pursue an appraisal action to ensure he or she has 
received adequate compensation,21 he or she cannot prevent the merger from 
                                                          
19 Id. § 251(b)(5).  The legislative synopsis of the 2003 amendment to Section 251(b)(5) states: 
The amendments to Sections 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 263 and 264 
clarify that shares or other interests of a constituent corporation or other entity to a 
merger or consolidation may be converted, cancelled or unaffected by the merger. 
Del. S.B. 84 syn., 142d Gen. Assem. (2003). 
20 8 Del. C. § 251(c). 
21 See id. § 262. 
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proceeding on the basis of absence of consent.22  Importantly, it is clear from the 
express words of the statute that this outcome is a possibility.23 
Section 273 applies to joint ventures owned in equal parts by two 
stockholders and expressly allows for dissolution over the objection of one of 
them.24  Its purpose is to alleviate a “fundamental deadlock” by “removing the 
need for obtaining a unanimous vote[.]”25  Section 273 “contemplates that the 
Court of Chancery will enforce an agreed-upon disposition of the assets or, absent 
such agreement, that the court may order compulsory dissolution of the venture.”26  
Thus, Section 273 expressly permits dissolution of a joint venture even if one 50% 
owner objects.  “The legislature enacted Section 273 to provide a speedy method 
of dissolving a joint venture corporation when its two 50/50 shareholders are in 
                                                          
22 Assuming the merger was otherwise beyond reproach. 
23 The Majority states that, “[m]any Delaware statutes, including those dealing with certain 
mergers, subject stockholders to giving up their shares over their objection.”  Majority Op. at 22.  
I agree.  The point the Majority completely fails to address is that all of these statutes expressly 
provide fair notice to stockholders that this may occur. 
24 The Majority acknowledges that this case “does not fall precisely under [Section] 273[,]” 
presumably because the Company has three stockholders and is not a joint venture.  Majority Op. 
at 23.  Being “within a whisker” of Section 273 ignores the core principle that “[t]he legislative 
body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and construction, and 
when different terms are used in various parts of a statute it is reasonable to assume that a 
distinction between the terms was intended.”  Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citation omitted).  For the same reason, it is unreasonable to broadly read the 
“except when the Court shall otherwise order” language in Section 226 as affording the trial 
court broad discretion to employ Section 273‟s remedial provisions.  See Majority Op. at 22-23. 
25 In re Arthur Treacher’s Fish & Chips, 1980 WL 268070, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1980). 
26 Edward P. Welch, Robert S. Saunders, & Jennifer C. Voss, Folk on the Delaware General 
Corporation Law § 273.1, at 10-63 (6th ed. 2016). 
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deadlock.”27  Section 273(a) provides, in relevant part: 
If the stockholders of a corporation of this State, having only 2 
stockholders each of which own 50% of the stock therein, shall be 
engaged in the prosecution of a joint venture and if such stockholders 
shall be unable to agree upon the desirability of discontinuing such 
joint venture and disposing of the assets used in such venture, either 
stockholder may, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of 
incorporation of the corporation or in a written agreement between 
the stockholders, file with the Court of Chancery a petition stating that 
it desires to discontinue such joint venture and to dispose of the assets 
used in such venture in accordance with a plan to be agreed upon by 
both stockholders or that, if no such plan shall be agreed upon by both 
stockholders, the corporation be dissolved. . . .28 
“Accordingly, the Court may provide relief to a shareholder if (1) the corporation 
has only two 50% shareholders (2) who are prosecuting a joint venture and (3) who 
are unable to agree on discontinuing the joint venture.”29  The Majority‟s attempt 
to bring this case within the ambit of Section 273 ignores the significance of that 
separate statute—a point acknowledged by the Chancellor, who agreed that Section 
273 did not apply.30   
Section 303(a) provides that corporate actions taken pursuant to orders of the 
courts in federal bankruptcy proceedings may be taken “without further action by 
                                                          
27 Wah Chang Smelting & Refining Co. of Am. v. Cleveland Tungsten Inc., 1996 WL 487941, at 
*3 (Del. Ch. Aug 19, 1996) (citations omitted). 
28 8 Del. C. § 273(a) (emphasis added).   
29 Wah Chang, 1996 WL 487941, at *3 (citing In re Coffee Assocs., Inc., 1993 WL 512505 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 3, 1993)).   
30 See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *2 n.7 (“Elting initially asserted a claim 
for dissolution in C.A. No. 9700-CB under 8 Del. C. § 273.  Ms. Shawe‟s legal ownership of one 
percent of TPG made that statute inapplicable, and Elting appropriately withdrew that claim.”). 
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[the corporation‟s] directors or stockholders” and that “[s]uch power and authority 
may be exercised” by a representative appointed by the court “with like effect as if 
exercised and taken by unanimous action of the directors and stockholders of the 
corporation.”31  These actions may allow the corporation, for example, to: 
amend its certificate of incorporation, and make any change in its 
capital or capital stock, or any other amendment, change, or alteration, 
or provision, authorized by this chapter; be dissolved, transfer all or 
part of its assets, merge or consolidate as permitted by this chapter, in 
which case, however, no stockholder shall have any statutory right of 
appraisal of such stockholder‟s stock . . . .32 
In contrast to each of the provisions above, Section 226 contains no language that 
suggests that a court-ordered custodian has the power to compel a forced 
disposition of a stockholder‟s personal property (stock). 
Relatedly, other provisions of the DGCL address restrictions on transfers of 
stock and also make clear that restrictions must be stated expressly and clearly.  
For example, restrictions are often utilized in closely held corporations in order to 
protect the utilization of certain tax treatment.  Section 202 sets forth requirements 
for a valid restriction on the transfers of securities.  The restriction must be “noted 
conspicuously” on the stock certificate, and it may be imposed in the corporation‟s 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws.33  Also, “[u]nless noted conspicuously” on 
                                                          
31 8 Del. C. § 303(a). 
32 Id. § 303(b). 
33 Id. § 202(a)-(b). 
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the stock certificate, such restrictions are “ineffective except against a person with 
actual knowledge of the restriction.”34  Notably, the “noted conspicuously” and 
“actual knowledge” phrases are derived from the Uniform Commercial Code (the 
“UCC”) as adopted in Delaware (to which Section 159 refers) and “should be 
interpreted in light of the relevant Code definitions.”35  
Although Delaware courts generally have been reluctant to invalidate stock 
restrictions,36 this approach is “consistent with the general principle that Delaware 
corporate law is enabling, and does not impose choices on market participants.”37  
“Delaware public policy generally empowers market participants to decide for 
themselves whether to enter into contracts restricting their right to sell their 
shares.”38  But a forced transfer, untethered to any express statutory authorization, 
and absent notice of such possible defeasance, divestiture, or transfer, is counter to 
the principles of free alienation.  The general view that the DGCL is broadly 
enabling does not undercut the conclusion that Section 226 ought to be construed 
                                                          
34 Id. § 202(a).  Section 202(c) describes various types of restrictions on transfers of securities 
which are permissible under that Section. 
35 Folk, supra note 26, § 202.06 at 6-19 (listing the following UCC provisions:  6 Del. C. § 1-
201(10) (“conspicuous”) and 6 Del. C. § 1-202 (definitions of “notice,” “knowledge,” etc.)). 
36 Capital Grp. Cos., Inc. v. Armour, 2005 WL 678564, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2005). 
37 Id.  This is clear in a number of different contexts.  See, e.g., Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (“Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right to control 
and vote their shares in their own interest. . . . Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its 
holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale would 
profit the minority.” (citations omitted)). 
38 Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (citing 8 Del. C. § 202), 
aff’d as modified, 737 A.2d 530, 1999 WL 636634 (Del. July 28, 1999) (TABLE). 
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narrowly by a court to bar a custodian‟s sale of a stockholder‟s stock absent 
consent.  Rather, the enabling aspect of the DGCL implies an element of 
consensual structuring of the corporate contract concerning the relevant 
participants.39  
To further illustrate the importance attributed to fair notice in the DGCL, in 
Grimes, this Court identified as one of “two fundamental policies of Corporation 
Law” ensuring “certainty in the instruments upon which the corporation‟s capital 
structure is based.”40  This Court repeated the need for “strict adherence to 
statutory formality in matters relating to the issuance of capital stock” and noted 
that “Delaware‟s statutory structure implements these policies through a „clear and 
easily followed legal roadmap‟ of statutory provisions.”41  There, this Court 
rejected a claim of validity of an oral promise made to a stockholder by the CEO to 
sell ten percent of the corporation‟s future private stock offering to the stockholder.  
This Court held that Sections 151, 152, 153, 157, 161, and 166 of the DGCL, when 
read together, “contemplate board approval and a written instrument evidencing 
                                                          
39 See, e.g., Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(noting that the DGCL is “widely regarded as the most flexible in the nation because it leaves the 
parties to the corporate contract (managers and stockholders) with great leeway to structure their 
relations, subject to relatively loose statutory constraints”); see also Folk, supra note 26, § 202.6, 
at 6-20 n.58 (observing that “[t]he argument that a restriction may be imposed without the 
stockholder‟s consent, based upon a reserved general power to amend the corporation‟s 
certificate, has been rejected” (citing B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 
818, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1974))). 
40 Grimes, 804 A.2d at 260 (citing Kalageorgi, 750 A.2d at 538-39). 
41 Id. (quoting Kalageorgi, 750 A.2d at 538). 
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the relevant transactions affecting issuance of stock and the corporation‟s capital 
structure.”42  In the instant case, although factually distinguishable, the same need 
for “[c]ertainty in investor expectations”43 suggests a court should not have power 
to order stockholders to sell their stock to a third party over their objections—
without, at least, advance statutory fair notice to stockholders of such a possibility. 
This narrower construction of Section 226 is further supported by examining 
the special provisions for close corporations in Sections 352 and 353, which also 
embody concepts of notice and consent, as well as a statutory preference for less 
drastic, interim remedies to address deadlock situations.  For example, Sections 
352 and 353 expressly provide for provisional directors in deadlock situations.  
Section 352 empowers the Court of Chancery, in addition to Section 226, to 
appoint a custodian for a close corporation in two scenarios.  The first is where 
“[p]ursuant to § 351 of this title the business and affairs of the corporation are 
managed by the stockholders and they are so divided that the business of the 
corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury and any remedy 
with respect to such deadlock provided in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws 
                                                          
42 Id. at 261.  Section 166, for example, “relating to the formalities required of stock 
subscriptions, provides that subscription agreements are not enforceable against the subscriber 
unless in writing and signed by the subscriber.”  Id. 
43 Id. at 266. 
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or in any written agreement of the stockholders has failed[.]”44  The second occurs 
where a stockholder has the “right to the dissolution of the corporation under a 
provision of the certificate of incorporation permitted by § 355 of this title.”45  
Notably, under Section 355, a stockholder of a close corporation does not have a 
right of dissolution unless that right is provided in the corporation‟s charter.  
Again, the concepts of fair notice and consent are expressly set forth in the statute.  
Subsections 355(b) and (c) provide: 
(b) If the certificate of incorporation as originally filed does not 
contain a provision authorized by subsection (a) of this section, the 
certificate may be amended to include such provision if adopted by 
the affirmative vote of the holders of all the outstanding stock, 
whether or not entitled to vote, unless the certificate of incorporation 
specifically authorizes such an amendment by a vote which shall be 
not less than 2/3 of all the outstanding stock whether or not entitled to 
vote. 
                                                          
44 8 Del. C. § 352(a)(1).  To invoke management by the stockholders pursuant to Section 351, the 
corporation must be a close corporation, its certificate of incorporation must “provide that the 
business of the corporation shall be managed by the stockholders of the corporation rather than 
by a board of directors[,]” and the existence of the provision on the certificate must be “noted 
conspicuously on the face or back of every stock certificate issued by such corporation.”  Id. 
§ 351.  If these requirements are satisfied, such corporations may avoid calling stockholder 
meetings to elect directors, all stockholders are by default considered directors, and all 
stockholders are “subject to all liabilities of directors.”  Id.  Because TransPerfect is not a close 
corporation and is managed by a board of directors, Section 351 does not apply and, likewise, 
neither does the possibility of seeking appointment of a custodian pursuant to Section 352(a)(1).  
However, the General Assembly‟s approach to deadlock in the context of close corporations is 
relevant, particularly since TransPerfect has only three stockholders. 
45 Id. § 352(a)(2).  Section 355 permits a close corporation to provide in its certificate of 
incorporation that one or more stockholders, or a percentage of the stockholders, may force the 
corporation to dissolve.  Id. § 355(a).  The provision will not be effective unless each of the 
corporation‟s stock certificates “conspicuously note[s]” the existence of the provision.  Id. 
§ 355(c).  Cf. Fletcher, supra note 5, at § 8035 (“[S]tatutory provisions for judicial dissolution of 
corporations are strictly construed.”). 
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(c) Each stock certificate in any corporation whose certificate of 
incorporation authorizes dissolution as permitted by this section shall 
conspicuously note on the face thereof the existence of the provision. 
Unless noted conspicuously on the face of the stock certificate, the 
provision is ineffective.46 
As an alternative to appointing a custodian, Section 353(a) provides: 
[T]he Court of Chancery may appoint a provisional director for a 
close corporation if the directors are so divided respecting the 
management of the corporation‟s business and affairs that the votes 
required for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained with 
the consequence that the business and affairs of the corporation can no 
longer be conducted to the advantage of the stockholders generally.47   
Additionally, “Section 352(b) expressly invites the [c]ourt to opt for the less 
intrusive remedy of a provisional director as authorized by Section 353 if the 
[c]ourt concludes that such an alternative order would be in the best interests of the 
corporation.  Accordingly, the [c]ourt is authorized—and, by virtue of this 
provision, mildly encouraged—to consider resort to that more limited remedy even 
if the petition itself makes no application for such relief.”48 
Delaware law also provides for both statutory and equitable dissolution of 
Delaware corporations, either of which may cause the involuntary divestiture of 
stockholders‟ personal property interests.  Subchapter X of the DGCL details the 
                                                          
46 8 Del. C. § 355(b)-(c) (emphasis added). 
47 Id. § 353(a). 
48 Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery § 8.09[e][1], at 8-221 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2014) (footnote 
omitted).   
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procedures for dissolution.49  Section 275 provides, in relevant part: 
(a) If it should be deemed advisable in the judgment of the board of 
directors of any corporation that it should be dissolved, the board, 
after the adoption of a resolution to that effect by a majority of the 
whole board at any meeting called for that purpose, shall cause notice 
of the adoption of the resolution and of a meeting of stockholders to 
take action upon the resolution to be mailed to each stockholder 
entitled to vote thereon as of the record date for determining the 
stockholders entitled to notice of the meeting. 
(b) At the meeting a vote shall be taken upon the proposed 
dissolution.  If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation 
entitled to vote thereon shall vote for the proposed dissolution, a 
certification of dissolution shall be filed with the Secretary of State 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. 
(c) Dissolution of a corporation may also be authorized without action 
of the directors if all the stockholders entitled to vote thereon shall 
consent in writing and a certificate of dissolution shall be filed with 
the Secretary of State pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.50 
The dissolution process contemplated by Section 275 is voluntary in that 
dissolution will only occur if a majority of stockholders either vote in favor of the 
dissolution or consent of all stockholders to the dissolution is obtained in writing.  
However, much like a merger under the DGCL, a dissenting stockholder may be 
involuntarily divested of his or her property interest even if he or she votes against 
the majority.51  The dissolution statutory scheme contemplates both relinquishment 
                                                          
49 8 Del. C. §§ 271-85. 
50 Id. § 275. 
51 The Court of Chancery‟s power to order equitable dissolution also does not support the 
argument that the court has broad power to order a custodian to sell a corporation over the 
objections of stockholders in these circumstances.  Under the doctrine of equitable dissolution, a 
court of equity “may order the dissolution of a solvent company and the appointment of a 
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of an interest in personal property and the protective mechanism of a stockholder 
vote.     
At oral argument, there was a suggestion that Ms. Shawe conceded in her 
Reply Brief that the Court of Chancery had the power to order dissolution or 
liquidation here and that, a fortiori, the Court could have ordered a sale of the 
entire company.  I did not read Ms. Shawe‟s Reply Brief to concede that either 
dissolution or liquidation would be appropriate here, and, indeed, at oral argument 
her counsel strongly contended that the references in her Reply Brief were 
intended to apply only when a company is insolvent—a situation unquestionably 
not present here.  I disagree with that suggestion, in any event, since Section 
226(b) explicitly establishes the overarching requirement that “the authority of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
custodian or receiver „only upon a showing of gross mismanagement, positive misconduct by 
corporate officers, breach of trust, or extreme circumstances showing imminent danger of great 
loss to the corporation which, otherwise, cannot be prevented.‟”  Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 
506, 543 (Del. Ch. 2006) (quoting Chapman v. Fluorodynamics, Inc., 1970 WL 806, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 20, 1970)).  Courts “exercise[] this power to dissolve a solvent corporation with „great 
restraint‟ and only upon a „strong showing.‟”  Id. (citations omitted).  Further, “[m]ere dissension 
among corporate stockholders seldom, if ever, justifies the appointment of a receiver for a 
solvent corporation.”  Id. (quoting Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 163 A.2d 288, 293 
(Del. Ch. 1960)); see also VTB Bank v. Navitron Projects Corp., 2014 WL 1691250, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 28, 2014) (“Where the company is solvent, a „strong showing‟ is necessary to invoke 
[the remedy of the equitable appointment of a receiver, which] should „not be resorted to if 
milder measures will give the plaintiff, whether creditor or shareholder, adequate protection for 
his rights.‟” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Theodora Hldg. Corp. v. Henderson, 257 
A.2d 398, 406 (Del. Ch. 1969) (“It is plain, we think, that for a court to order a dissolution or 
liquidation of a solvent corporation, the proponents must show . . . a fraudulent disregard of the 
minority‟s rights, or some other fact which indicates an imminent danger of great loss resulting 
from fraudulent or absolute mismanagement.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The Court of Chancery expressly found that equitable dissolution was not warranted 
here because “the record does not show that Shawe engaged in self-dealing or financially 
enriched himself at the Company‟s expense.”  In re Shawe & Elting, LLC, 2015 WL 4874733 at 
*34. 
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custodian is to continue the business of the corporation and not to liquidate its 
affairs and distribute its assets.”  A dissolution under the circumstances here would 
be inconsistent with that express statutory requirement.52  No one has seriously 
                                                          
52  Moreover, the language in Section 226(b) creating three circumscribed “exceptions” to 
the general requirement that a custodian “continue the business of the corporation and not . . . 
liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets,” cannot reasonably be read to authorize the forced 
sale of a solvent corporation to a third party over the objections of its stockholders.  The 
exceptions in Section 226(b) allow for deviation from the general rule that the custodian must 
continue the business only “when the Court shall otherwise order and except in cases arising 
under paragraph (a)(3) of this section or § 352(a)(2) of this title.”  8 Del. C. § 226(b).  First, this 
“exception” language does not provide express notice of a possible defeasance of one‟s 
ownership interest in stock—unlike other statutes which explicitly contemplate defeasance, 
whether voluntary or involuntary, as a possibility.  Nor does Section 226‟s reference to Section 
291 provide sufficient notice of such a possible defeasance, since, among other things, Section 
291 applies only to insolvent corporations.  The Majority avoids this point altogether.   
Second, the three exceptions necessarily modify the custodian‟s default obligation to 
continue the business of the corporation and not to liquidate its affairs or distribute its assets.  
The second and third exceptions simply provide for limited circumstances in which a custodian‟s 
default obligation does not apply—namely, where a corporation has abandoned its business (as 
in Section 226(a)(3)) or where a stockholder in a close corporation has the right, pursuant to the 
close corporation‟s certificate of incorporation, to dissolution of the close corporation (as in 
Section 352(a)(2)). 
The first exception (“except when the Court shall otherwise order”) logically should be 
read in the context of the second and third exceptions—both of which explicitly identify limited 
circumstances in which a custodian has no obligation to continue the business of the corporation.  
It is unreasonable, then, to read the first exception as empowering the Court of Chancery to 
fashion a remedy wholly incongruous with the two other exceptions.  Therefore, the first 
exception, as the second and third, can only reasonably be read to allow only for a similar 
discontinuation of the business (e.g., liquidation, distribution of assets, or dissolution).  
 In short, the exceptions in Section 226(b) do not authorize a forced sale of this solvent 
corporation to a third party over the objections of stockholders.  Perhaps that is why the Majority 
endeavors mightily to equate the proposed forced auction of TransPerfect to one of the scenarios 
contemplated by the exceptions in Section 226(b) (which contemplate discontinuation of the 
business)—a liquidation, a dissolution, or a distribution of assets.  The problem with that lies in 
the fact that a sale or auction of a thriving business is a far cry from a liquidation, dissolution, or 
distribution of assets.  The remedy of a sale does not contemplate, as do liquidation, dissolution, 
and distribution of assets, the winding up of a corporation‟s business.  Thus, to the limited extent 
that Section 226(b) empowers a custodian to undertake a liquidation, dissolution, or distribution 
of assets, that power does not, a fortiori, allow a custodian to auction the corporation over the 
objections of its stockholders. 
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argued on appeal that a dissolution, an asset sale, or a liquidation is an option.53  
The Majority acknowledges that “[n]either Elting nor Shawe want an asset sale,” 
which it says could result in “ruinous consequences[.]”54 
Other involuntary divestitures outside the corporate arena support the 
concept that express statutory authorization is needed for a court-ordered forced 
sale to occur.  For example, “[e]quity courts have historically upheld the right of a 
tenant in common to seek a partition of personal property.”55  The partition of real 
property is contemplated by 25 Del. C. § 721(a), which provides:  
When any 2 or more persons hold lands and tenements within this 
State as joint tenants or tenants in common, or as parceners under the 
intestate laws of this State, or when any persons hold an interest either 
in possession or in remainder in lands and tenements within this State, 
. . . any 1 or more of them . . . may present a petition to the Court of 
Chancery . . . .  The petition shall state the facts, describe the lands 
and tenements so held, and pray partition thereof among the several 
parties entitled to such lands and tenements according to their several 
and respective interests.56 
                                                          
53 The Majority‟s statement that I have suggested that “a lesser remedy like asset sales and 
dissolution” would be more acceptable remedies is perplexing and just plain wrong.  Majority 
Op. at 24.  Nowhere do I suggest that they are “lesser remedies” or that stockholders of solvent 
companies would prefer these remedies. 
54 Id. at 24. 
55 JFL, Inc. v. NJE Aircraft Corp., 1988 WL 58274, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 2, 1988); see Carradin 
v. Carradin, 1980 WL 10015, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1980) (“A bill seeking partition of 
personal property is unquestionably within the historical jurisdiction of equity courts[.]”). 
56 25 Del. C. § 721(a); see id. § 751 (conferring on the Court of Chancery “general equity 
powers” to effect partition). 
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“Partition means a severance of interests which are concurrent.”57  “The 
purpose of a partition proceeding is to eliminate a present concurrent interest in the 
same property so that each owner may enjoy and possess his or her interest in 
severalty.”58  As a general rule, a co-owner‟s right to seek partition of jointly 
owned property is “almost absolute, since the right is an incident of common 
ownership.”59  Importantly, this remedy is part of a statutory scheme that expressly 
contemplates the relinquishment of some or all of co-owners‟ property interests, 
including by a court-ordered sale.60 
The Court of Chancery‟s decisions appointing a custodian and accepting the 
Custodian‟s recommendation with respect to the Modified Auction contain no 
textual analysis of the relevant statutory scheme.  Instead, the Chancellor relied on 
two cases, which are distinguishable due to the presence of stockholder consent to 
                                                          
57 Peters v. Robinson, 636 A.2d 926, 929 (Del. 1994) (“Such types of contemporaneous co-
ownerships are usually either joint tenancies or tenancies in common.”). 
58 Id. (citations omitted). 
59 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 597 A.2d 856, 859 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1990) (citing 68 C.J.S. Partition 
§ [30]) (additional citation omitted); see also Chalfant v. Cornett, 1996 WL 162262, at *2-4 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1996) (discussing the limited circumstances in which courts may equitably 
deny the right to partition).  Similarly, Delaware law provides for the equitable division, 
distribution, and assignment of marital property in proceedings for divorce or annulment.  See 13 
Del. C. § 1513(a). 
60 See 25 Del. C. §§ 729, 733; Libeau v. Fox, 892 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Del. 2006) (“If a physical 
division of the property would be detrimental to the co-owners‟ interests, the Court of Chancery 
may order that the property be sold at public auction and the proceeds divided among the co-
owners.”). 
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the sales in both of those cases.  In Bentas v. Haseotes,61 the parties agreed that 
liquidation was necessary but disagreed on the method that would “maximize 
stockholder value.”62  In Fulk v. Washington Service Associates, Inc.,63 the parties 
“endorse[d]” and “support[ed]” a custodian‟s plan for sale of a corporation 
pursuant to Section 273, objecting only to certain closing terms.64  
Moreover, it is no answer, as Ms. Elting suggests, that Section 394 provides 
that all corporations agree to make all provisions (including Section 226) part of 
their respective charters.65  This is a circular argument.66  The question here is what 
are the limits, if any, of the court‟s power under Section 226?  Our statutory 
scheme should be read harmoniously.67  Reading the statutory scheme 
                                                          
61 2003 WL 1711856 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003). 
62 Id. at *2-3 (describing the parties‟ competing plans for liquidation). 
63 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002). 
64 Id. at *6. 
65 8 Del. C. § 394 (“This chapter and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter or 
certificate of incorporation of every corporation except so far as the same are inapplicable and 
inappropriate to the objects of the corporation.”).  The Majority suggests that when stockholders 
buy stock in a Delaware corporation, they should understand that the “Court of Chancery has 
broad authority to address corporate deadlocks” and to “deal sensibly with corporations[.]”  
Majority Op. at 23.  What is sensible, though, is that investors should be able to expect that 
courts will adhere to the statutory and common law road map respecting capital stock.  The 
words “otherwise order” do not constitute adequate notice that a stockholder could be forced to 
sell her holdings in a forced auction of a thriving company. 
66 The circularity of Ms. Elting‟s argument is apparent.  For example, she contends that “[Ms. 
Shawe‟s] interest in the Company has always been subject to all the provisions of the [DGCL], 
including [S]ection 226, which constitutes an integral part of [the Company‟s] charter and 
authorizes the court-ordered sale at issue.”  Answering Br. at 4. 
67 See Grimes, 804 A.2d at 260, 265 n.35 (citing 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction § 46:05 (2000) (“[E]ach part or section [of a statute] should be construed in 
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harmoniously compels the conclusion that Section 226 does not permit the Court 
of Chancery to confer upon a custodian the power to sell a corporation over the 
objection of its shareholders.  Thus, I believe that the Court of Chancery erred by 
ordering the Modified Auction.  
II. 
The Common Law Rule of Judicial Restraint Regarding 
Custodial Powers Suggests a More Limited Remedy 
Similarly, the policies of judicial restraint embedded in our common law 
underlying Section 226 suggest that the Modified Auction Order‟s forced sale 
provision goes too far.  Historically, “the common law generally disdained judicial 
relief of any kind with respect to a solvent but deadlocked corporation.”68  Though 
the pre-1967 iteration of Section 226 vested in the Court of Chancery the discretion 
to appoint receivers of and for deadlocked corporations, the court was hesitant to 
interfere in the business of deadlocked but solvent companies.69  This Court has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” (alterations in 
Grimes))). 
68 Wolfe & Pittenger, supra note 48, § 8.09[b], at 8-203; see Salnita Corp. v. Walter Hldg. Corp., 
168 A. 74, 75 (Del. Ch. 1933) (“A court should never wrest control of a business from the hands 
of those who have demonstrated their ability to manage it well, unless it be satisfied that no 
course, short of the violent one, is open as a corrective to great and imminent harm.”).   
69 See Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272, 272-74 (Del. Ch. 1958) (“Plaintiffs 
emphasize that this deadlock can go on indefinitely, which is true.  But such a consequence is 
necessarily implicit in the arithmetic of stock holdings.  In and of itself it is not a sufficient 
reason to appoint a receiver under the present law.”); see also Hall, 163 A.2d at 293 (“Under 
some circumstances courts of equity will appoint liquidating receivers for solvent corporations, 
but the power to do so is always exercised with great restraint and only upon a showing of gross 
mismanagement, positive misconduct by the corporate officers, breach of trust, or extreme 
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observed that the General Assembly‟s intent with respect to the 1967 revisions 
“was to ease the onerous burden of proof under the prior case law which made the 
appointment of a receiver for a solvent corporation almost hopeless, despite a 
potentially permanent shareholder-deadlock.”70   
But even so, this Court has determined that “[t]he involvement of the Court 
of Chancery and its custodian in the corporation‟s business and affairs should be 
kept to a minimum and should be exercised only insofar as the goals of fairness 
and justice, as stated [in Giuricich], require.”71  Consistent with this sentiment, at 
least since the 1967 revisions, the parties have pointed to no case in which the 
Court of Chancery has exercised its power under Section 226 to order that a 
company be sold over stockholder objection.72  Although cases exist in which the 
Court of Chancery has authorized a custodian to sell a deadlocked corporation 
pursuant to Section 226, such authorization has been granted only upon agreement 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
circumstances showing imminent danger of great loss to the corporation which, otherwise, 
cannot be prevented.”). 
70 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238-39 (footnote omitted).  This Court has stated that pre-1967 cases 
applying “general equitable principles” or earlier statutes addressing stockholder deadlock are 
“neither governing nor persuasive” in applications of the modern version of Section 226.  Id. at 
236.  However, the common law backdrop against which today‟s Section 226 evolved is helpful 
to understanding the scope of custodial power intended by the General Assembly. 
71Id. at 240; see Miller, 2009 WL 554920, at *4. 
72 Also, there appears to be no such court-ordered sales prior to the current version of the statute.  
Cf. Tansey v. Oil Producing Royalties, Inc., 133 A.2d 141, 146-47 (Del. Ch. 1957) (ordering 
appointment of a liquidating receiver for a solvent corporation, without noting whether any 
stockholders objected, due to the gross mismanagement of the corporation by its majority 
stockholder, who testified at trial that he intended to dissolve the company anyway). 
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by stockholders that a sale was appropriate.  In particular, the cases on which Ms. 
Elting relies nearly universally involved situations where the stockholders 
consented to a sale.73  For example, in Fulk,74 a stockholder sought relief under 
Section 273, and a court-appointed custodian recommended a sale process in 
which one stockholder would buy the other‟s fifty percent share.75  With the 
exception of certain details,76 the parties “endorse[d]” and “support[ed]” the 
custodian‟s plan.77  Likewise, in Bentas,78 the Court of Chancery ordered that a 
corporation be auctioned only after two stockholder factions submitted competing 
proposals to liquidate the company.  More recently, in EB Trust v. Information 
Management Services, Inc.,79 the parties to a Section 226 proceeding “agreed that a 
sale of 100% of the stock of the [c]ompany is the best means of maximizing value 
                                                          
73 One case did not involve a sale, but rather a discovery dispute.  In Brown v. Rosenberg, 1981 
WL 7638 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981), the Court of Chancery stated that “it is more likely than 
unlikely that a [c]ourt will end up appointing a receiver to liquidate a corporation where there are 
but two stockholders, both of whom own 50% of the corporation‟s shares, when they are unable 
to agree on anything.”  Brown, 1981 WL 7638, at *5.  This language, which has never been cited 
by another court, appears in dictum at the end of the court‟s order resolving a discovery dispute 
between the parties.  Id. 
74 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002). 
75 Id. at *5. 
76 For instance, the stockholders disagreed on whether the seller and the company‟s employees 
could be enjoined from competing with the corporation following the sale.  Id. at *6. 
77 Id.; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. at 3, Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc., No. 17747 (Del. Ch. June 
4, 2001) (“[T]he parties are in agreement that this corporation needs to be dissolved.”). 
78 See Bentas v. Haseotes (Bentas I), 1999 WL 1022112 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 1999); Bentas v. 
Haseotes (Bentas II), 769 A.2d 70 (Del. Ch. 2000); Bentas v. Haseotes (Bentas III), 2003 WL 
1711856 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003). 
79 Order Appointing Custodian, EB Trust v. Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 9443 (Del. Ch. June 17, 
2014) (ORDER). 
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for the benefit of the stockholders[.]”80  Similarly, in In re Supreme Oil 
Company,81 “the parties agreed [in a Section 226 action] that a sale of 100% of the 
stock of the [c]ompany or the buy-out of [one of two competing stockholder 
groups], as the case may be, may be the best means of maximizing value for the 
benefit of the stockholders.”82   
Stockholder consent has a significant effect on the extent to which a remedy 
intrudes upon a corporation‟s business and affairs.  The existence of consent by 
stockholders to a sale alters the dynamic with respect to the Court of Chancery‟s 
exercise of its discretion in those cases.  Almost by definition, if there is consent, 
there is less “intrusion.”83 
Cases in which the Court of Chancery has appointed custodians for solvent 
corporations support a narrowly tailored, incremental approach to the custodian‟s 
power.  For example, in Miller v. Miller,84 the Court of Chancery rejected a fifty-
                                                          
80 Id. at 2. 
81 2015 WL 2455952 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (ORDER). 
82 Id. at *1.   
83 See Intrusion, BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “intrusion” as “[a] 
person‟s entering without permission”).  In Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), this 
Court rejected the suggestion that there should be special, judicially-created rules to “protect” 
minority stockholders of closely-held Delaware corporations.  There, we commented that, “[i]t 
would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc 
ruling which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not 
contracted.”  Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380.  Elting and Shawe could have, but failed to negotiate an 
exit strategy.  A sale of TransPerfect would give each stockholder a pro rata interest in the 
control premium to which they otherwise would not be entitled. 
84 2009 WL 554920. 
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percent stockholder‟s attempt to secure appointment of a custodian to divide or 
liquidate a corporation, reasoning that “[t]he mere existence of an even stockholder 
split does not, by itself, authorize dissolution of the corporation or the sale of its 
only asset through the appointment of a custodian under 8 Del. C. § 226, at least 
without more.”85  Instead, the custodian‟s “powers should be tailored as narrowly 
as possible because judicially-supervised interference with the ordinary operation 
of a corporation should be kept to a minimum.”86  The court appointed a custodian 
for a two-year term to “break material deadlocks” between the two equal 
stockholders, “resolve operational deadlocks[,]” and “seek to resolve the impasse 
over the future of” the corporation.87  It explicitly instructed the custodian not to 
“sell or divide” the corporation‟s assets.88   
The Court of Chancery‟s decisions in Bentas89 illustrate the principle that the 
court should minimize its intrusion in the business of the corporation—and actually 
attempt (not merely consider and reject) less intrusive remedies.  There, four 
stockholder-directors, who owned the corporation in equal shares, were divided 
into two factions.  After one faction sought appointment of a custodian, the Court 
of Chancery initially declined to appoint a custodian, and instead ordered a 
                                                          
85 Id. at *5 (citing 8 Del. C. § 226). 
86 Id. at *4. 
87 Id. at *5. 
88 Id. at *5 n.21. 
89 See Bentas I, 1999 WL 1022112; Bentas II, 769 A.2d 70; Bentas III, 2003 WL 1711856. 
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stockholders‟ meeting pursuant to Section 211 to determine whether the 
stockholders were deadlocked.90  As a result of the meeting, two family directors 
were elected, and the remaining two family directors did not receive the requisite 
votes and became holdover directors.91  The court thereafter appointed a custodian, 
reasoning that the circumstances, including the holdover directors‟ history of 
exercising “negative control” over the company by defeating quorum at board 
meetings,92 implicated a “concern that [Section] 226(a)(1) is designed to remedy, 
namely, a stockholder deadlock that would „permit control of the corporation to 
remain indefinitely in the hands of a self-perpetuating board of directors.‟”93   
As to the scope of the appointment, the defendants sought authorization for 
the custodian either to divide the company‟s assets into two corporations, “cause 
the corporation to purchase the plaintiffs‟ interest in the [c]ompany[,]” or, “failing 
either of the above described alternatives, sell the [c]ompany to a third party, 
structured either as an asset or stock sale.”94  The plaintiffs advocated a role in 
which the custodian would “investigate potential solutions to resolve the deadlock 
among the stockholders; to recommend such solutions to the stockholders; and in 
the event no proposal is acceptable to all of the stockholders, to recommend 
                                                          
90 Bentas I, 1999 WL 1022112, at *1. 
91 Bentas II, 769 A.2d at 73. 
92 Id. at 78. 
93 Id. (quoting Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 239) (alterations omitted). 
94 Id. at 79. 
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liquidation of the [c]ompany to the [c]ourt.”95  The court favored the plaintiffs‟ 
approach and concluded that it was “more appropriate to empower the custodian to 
explore any and all alternatives that might result in a mutually agreed solution to 
the current shareholder deadlock.”96 
Three years later, the custodian filed a report “concluding that liquidation 
was necessary and desirable, and recommending an auction of the [c]ompany‟s 
assets as a single package or as a series of asset packages.”97  The parties submitted 
competing proposals, with each side arguing that “its proposal for liquidating the 
[c]ompany is the best way to maximize stockholder value.”98  The defendants 
sought division of the company‟s operating assets into two corporations, with one 
belonging to each of the two factions, but the custodian and the plaintiffs favored 
an auction.99  “The [p]laintiffs prefer[red] to sell the entire [c]ompany as a means 
of liquidation, but they also proposed a plan to partition the assets, since they knew 
the defendants would oppose a sale.”100  Because the parties did not desire a trial, 
the court determined that “only an auction [would] provide reliable information” 
                                                          
95 Id. at 80.  The plaintiffs also questioned whether Section 226 permitted the court to “direct the 
custodian to employ one or more of [the defendants‟ proposed] measures.”  Id. at 79.  The court 
did not explicitly agree or disagree with this statement, but observed generally that the plaintiffs 
“have the better position.”  Id. at 80. 
96 Id. at 80. 
97 Bentas III, 2003 WL 1711856, at *2. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
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about the value of the company.101  The Court of Chancery ordered an auction “to 
resolve the issues posed by the two pending motions” and determine “whether a 
viable market for the [c]ompany (or any of its lines of business) exists, and 
whether a sale of the entire [c]ompany will generate bids that reflect the 
[c]ompany‟s intrinsic value.”102  The court indicated that, should the auction “fail[] 
to attract any bidders . . . , the [c]ourt is free to decline to approve any sale, and to 
order a division of the assets according to the defendants‟ plan, or some other 
plan.”103  Thus, although the court ordered an auction of a solvent corporation in 
Bentas, it did so by degrees, exhausting less intrusive remedies first.  Further, all 
stockholders agreed that liquidation was necessary and that the Company could not 
continue in its existing form.   
The case law applying Section 226 therefore supports the view that the sale 
of the Company, absent stockholder consent, is too drastic a measure, and that the 
trial court should consider implementation of remedies on an incremental basis.104 
                                                          
101 Id. at *4. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 The Majority suggests that “less-intrusive measures” or “intermediate measures were 
attempted but failed.”  Majority Op. at 2, 13, 26.  This is perplexing.  A mediation and settlement 
efforts occurred, but no intermediate measures were “attempted and failed.” 
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III. 
In View of the Above, the Court of Chancery’s Remedy Here 
Was, at a Minimum, Too Extreme and Was Not Authorized by 
the Statute 
In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to appoint a custodian and, if 
so, for what purpose, the Court of Chancery believed it had three options.105  First, 
it could deny Elting‟s request for a custodian altogether “and leave the parties to 
their own devices.”106  The court did not find this option viable, however, because 
it found that TransPerfect‟s management was in a state of “complete and utter 
dysfunction[,]” and “it would be unjust to leave Elting with no recourse except to 
sell her 50% interest in the Company.”107  In particular, the court remarked that 
Elting would have difficulty selling her shares for a “fair price” due to Shawe‟s 
actions.108   
Second, the court recognized that it could “appoint a custodian to serve as a 
third director or some form of tie-breaking mechanism in the governance of the 
Company.”109  Such an appointment would complete the full board of directors as 
contemplated by TransPerfect‟s bylaws, which provide for three directors.110  The 
                                                          
105 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.   
110 See By-Laws of TransPerfect Global, Inc. at Art. II, § 2(a), available at B2857-67. 
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court believed, however, that doing so “would enmesh an outsider and, by 
extension, the [c]ourt into matters of internal corporate governance for an 
extensive period of time.”111  Noting that Shawe and Elting are “relatively young” 
and could continue in their positions with TransPerfect “for decades[,]” the court 
felt that it was “not sensible for the [c]ourt to exercise essentially perpetual 
oversight over the internal affairs of the Company.”112   
Third, the court considered appointing a custodian to sell the company, an 
alternative that the court recognized was “unusual” but, in its view, not 
unprecedented.113  However, as noted above, the cases relied on by the Chancellor 
in support of his decision were Bentas,114 in which the court ordered a sale only as 
a last resort, and Fulk,115 a Section 273 case in which the parties “had come to 
agree that the corporation needed to be dissolved.”116 
The Court of Chancery thus appointed a custodian who had previously 
                                                          
111 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31.  The cases discussed above suggest 
that the Court of Chancery had involvement in them for extended periods of time.   
112 Id.  
113 Id.  The Chancellor stated that the Court of Chancery “occasionally has appointed custodians 
to resolve deadlocks involving profitable corporations and authorized them to conduct a sale of 
the corporation.”  Id. (citing Bentas II, 769 A.2d at 73 n.3; Bentas III, 2003 WL 1711856; Fulk, 
2002 WL 1402273, at *2).   
114 Bentas II, 769 A.2d at 73 n.3; Bentas III, 2003 WL 1711856. 
115 2002 WL 1402273. 
116 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 n.320 (citation omitted).  Notably, 
Section 273 is not applicable here as there are three owners. 
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served as mediator to the parties.117  The court directed the custodian to “oversee a 
judicially ordered sale of the Company.”118  The accompanying Order 
demonstrates that any stockholder not purchasing the Company may be required to 
sell his or her shares.119  The court also directed the custodian, “[i]n the interim,” to 
“serve as a third director with the authority to vote on any matters on which Shawe 
and Elting cannot agree and which rise to the level that [the Custodian] deems to 
be significant to managing the Company‟s business and affairs.”120   
 In my view, the Court of Chancery failed to narrowly tailor the scope of the 
custodian‟s authority, which contemplates the possibility that each stockholder be a 
seller.  The court could have appointed a third director, as provided for in the 
company‟s bylaws, similar to the appointments made in Miller and Bentas.  
Although the Chancellor considered this option and appointed the custodian as an 
“interim” tiebreaker until the Modified Auction could be completed, he rejected 
this solution out of concern that the court would be involved in TransPerfect‟s 
                                                          
117 Id. at *32. 
118 Id.  
119 See In re TransPerfect Global, Inc., 2016 WL 3949840, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2016) 
(ORDER) (stating that the sale “may involve, without limitation, the sale of 100 percent of the 
Company‟s stock to a third party, or the sale of one or more of the stockholders‟ shares of stock 
in the Company to another stockholder and/or a third-party investor who has bid for such shares 
in conjunction with an existing stockholder”). 
120 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *32 (citing Bentas II, 769 A.2d at 79). 
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affairs for too long.121  The Chancellor did not consider the possibility of 
appointing a custodian for a period of time or expanding the Board to include 
independent directors.122  If these less drastic remedies failed, the custodian could 
petition the court for more drastic relief as in Bentas.  But absent consent, however, 
I do not believe a forced sale is a statutorily authorized option. 
IV. 
In conclusion, my construction of Section 226 takes account of property 
rights and due process protections because I believe these concepts are embedded 
in the relevant statutory framework.  This is evident in Section 159‟s express 
statement that stock is personal property, and in the other provisions of our 
statutory framework that provide clear and express notice in situations where 
defeasance of that property right might occur.  That is why, in reading our statutory 
scheme harmoniously, it is compelling not to imply the power of the Court to issue 
an order that can result in defeasance of these rights over the objections of the 
owners.  In cases where the stockholders do not object, then there is no such 
                                                          
121 Id. at *31, 32.  Mr. Shawe suggests on appeal that the Court of Chancery could have ordered 
amendment of the Company‟s bylaws “to expand the board by addition of independent directors” 
and that those directors could be delegated the responsibility of “elect[ing] successors and 
fill[ing] vacancies.”  Opening Br. of Philip R. Shawe at 22 n.8.  He contends that he “proposed 
additional alternatives before and during litigation.”  Id.  Mr. Shawe points to correspondence in 
which his lawyer made proposals on his behalf to counsel for Ms. Elting, including suggestions 
that Ms. Elting sell her stake in the company to a third party, offers for Mr. Shawe to purchase 
her shares, and a proposed shareholder agreement.  See A3169-80; A3186-93; A3274-78; 
A3329-65.   
122 See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *32; Miller, 2009 WL 554920, at *5. 
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potential infringement and the court would not be so limited in fashioning a 
remedy that invokes a sale or transfer of their shares.  This reading of Section 226 
is consistent with the long-standing policy of strictly limiting the powers of court-
appointed custodians. 
The Majority Opinion now puts stockholders on notice, at least 
prospectively, that in deadlock situations where a custodian is appointed pursuant 
to Section 226, a sale to a third party over the objections of stockholders is a 
potential permissible outcome, even for a thriving business.  This “judicially 
created notice” now accomplishes what is expressly stated in other provisions of 
the DGCL and other statutes where defeasance of property rights is possible.  
These stockholders, however, appear to be stuck with this unanticipated 
outcome.123 
                                                          
123 Ms. Shawe, for example, suggests that her constitutional arguments were not raised prior to 
trial because of the unforeseeable nature of the Chancellor‟s unprecedented interpretation of 
Section 226.  See Reply Br. of Shirley Shawe at 5. 
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